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New York City continues to face a serious crisis in housing affordability. While the city 
implements a plethora of top-down planning strategies to address this crisis, some are looking to 
more experimental, bottom-up approaches to not only affordable housing, but larger questions of 
community control, empowerment, and property stewardship. As the city’s stock of public land 
dwindles compared to decades ago, each parcel becomes increasingly important in the fight 
against the unrelenting real estate industry. This paper addresses these ongoing frictions through 
the lens of the Community Land Trust model, a form of shared-equity ownership that seeks to 
decommodify property and empower local residents. Consultation of relevant literature, 
background of the model in the United States, local contextual research on shared equity in New 
York, and interviews with those most embedded in the CLT movement all inform a set of final 
findings and recommendations for how the city government might best approach the grassroots 
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New York City’s housing climate is today more inaccessible than ever. Low income 
populations, particularly those of color, are continually faced with the threats and realities of 
displacement, landlord abuse, and few options. As traditional housing systems fall short in 
serving these communities, more and more are looking to alternatives that work for them. 
Shared-equity ownership models, such as community land trusts (CLTs) and housing 
cooperatives (known as HDFCs in New York) are examples of housing structures that are 
utilized to combat threats to affordability such as rent hikes, gentrification, and real estate 
speculation. Yet among significant grassroots support for these kinds of alternatives, they remain 
a small percentage of housing in New York City. With little governmental support and a 
powerful real estate industry keen on keeping its stake in the housing market, there are seemingly 
countless barriers to expanding and developing a thriving alternative housing landscape. Perhaps 
collective ownership, a somewhat ironic step for many in the direction of ownerless housing as a 
human right, is fundamentally opposed to how we think about ownership and living in this 
country, and thus cannot exist in a capitalist hub like New York. Or, considering the city’s rich 
history of tenant organizing, unparalleled portfolio of public and cooperative housing, and the 
growing excitement around CLTs, challenges facing the movement are in fact surmountable 
through robust policy interventions and continuous coalition building. For the urban planner, as 
affordability of housing continues to be one of the most important issues of our time, exploring 
new models of living in our country’s biggest and arguably most forward-thinking city is as 
relevant an inquiry as any. The background of this issue gives rise to three main questions for 
this research: 
 
1. What is the current landscape of housing in New York City, and how is affordability 
traditionally addressed? 
2. What have shared-equity models like community land trusts looked like in the city in 
both past and present? 
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3. What are the major challenges facing the CLT movement, and how can the city better 
support the model as it promotes both affordability and community control of land? 
 
As New York City becomes more expensive, low-income populations and communities 
of color are consistently displaced from deeply rooted neighborhoods, pushed to the fringes of 
the city with innumerable ramifications. Despite the city’s efforts to expand affordable housing 
incentives, maintain public housing, and enact new tenant protections, the housing market 
remains inaccessible to many of the city’s most vulnerable residents, arguably antithetical at its 
core to the notion of housing as a human right. If we are to agree that housing is a human right, 
or that the housing systems as they exist are not effective in addressing the population’s housing 
needs, or even that it is worthwhile exploring, supporting, and expanding alternatives to the 
dominant affordable housing strategies, then something as experimental yet applicable as popular 
communal ownership models should be interrogated, financed, and adopted into the city 
government’s extensive portfolio of housing development and support programs. 
Yet affordable housing is only one strategy possible under the CLT model. It seems that 
from the perspective of the city government, the model is best used in this form, to push its 
affordable housing agenda as one of many tools the city implements. Many organizations, 
however, are not simply interested in more affordable housing, but see CLTs as a means of 
returning land to the community, to garnering public control over property however community 
members, represented by and embodying the CLT organization, see fit. Perhaps that vision does 
not include housing at all. Thus, can the city support the model without controlling its purposes 
or restricting the community visions driving the movement? 
Today there are at least 13 organizations in New York City at some stage of establishing 
a CLT (Savitch-Lew, 2018). As the wider CLT movement is underway in its organizing and 
educational efforts, concrete policy action to regulate and incorporate the model into the larger 
landscape of land use is still relatively vacant. There is little city-wide research on the viability of 
community land trusts, where they may expand, and how to best transition practical land into 
communal ownership. In this regard, as CLTs continue to incorporate, the city has fallen behind. 
The recent City Council budget designation acts as a first step in adapting to housing activism in 
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the city, but humble financial assistance can only perhaps expand education and keep 
organizations afloat. Land acquisition is arguably the largest challenge to CLTs, particularly in a 
market like New York City, where property values are immeasurable and vacancy is nonexistent. 
The following research seeks to answer the aforementioned questions of affordability in 
New York City, its history of shared-equity programs, and the CLT movement as it stands today. 
Understanding the dual threats of displacement and disempowerment over land and its uses, we 
can analyze how the city has promoted collective ownership in the past to perhaps inform how 
they cna once again reinvest through the emerging CLT model. We begin with a background on 
the CLT model, how it has grown in the United States, and how we have reached the current 
moment of the movement. We then look to New York City, the landscape of displacement and 
disempowerment we seek to confront and remedy, followed by an overview of relevant programs 
employed by the city. We then investigate the CLT movement today, its challenges, and where 
the city might be able to intervene, through the eyes and opinions of those engrained in this 
work. Findings from these sections will then inform final recommendations, proposals of what 
must be done by both the city and organizers alike in terms of growing the capacity of the model, 
targeting viable property, and carefully investing in not only the property itself, but the 

















This study was primarily conducted through contextual research and data collection 
comprising multiple avenues and subjects. First, contextual research was conducted regarding 
the history of community land trusts in the United States, and how we arrived at the current 
moment and movement in an urban context. I then delve into the context of the current CLT 
movement in New York City, its roots in Cooper Square, and recent legislation and political 
steps made to further its growth and set the stage for this research. Following, data was collected 
on the current New York City housing landscape, including demographic and housing data 
derived from the Census, as well as rates of homelessness and eviction. Further data was 
collected on the various affordable housing programs, emphasizing the core strategies in tax 
credits and abatements, subsidies, and loan programs. The purposes of these first few phases are 
to set the crucial contextual framework for the moment we find ourselves in today, to understand 
the housing crisis as it stands in New York City, and begin to piece together how CLTs were 
created to combat real estate speculation and top-down planning, and to support ideals of 
affordability, equity, and community control. These sections also address our first research 
question, concerning the current context of affordability in New York City. 
I then conducted policy research around relevant programs and legislation that have been 
passed in New York to facilitate property transition, development, preservation, and financing 
that align to some extent with collective, ground-up ownership and governance. This is to 
identify alternative models to market housing and strictly top-down housing assistance, and to 
provide a groundwork for the study of current shared-equity, collective housing organizations in 
New York City. This information will primarily come from online city resources and previous 
policy research. The study of these programs illustrates the potential for further development of 
shared-equity support not only in political language but in legislative code, how the city’s history 
can inform its present in this regard. In this regard, our second research question regarding 
shared-equity models in New York City is answered. 
This is followed by a qualitative research phase, using collected qualitative interviews 
from various stakeholders in the collective housing movement. As a crucial component of this 
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project, individuals from several organizations involved in the CLT movement in New York City 
were interviewed on their thoughts regarding the topics of this research. Such qualitative analysis 
provides important firsthand perspectives on the state of housing in the city, the movement’s 
growth thus far, and the future of CLTs in such a high-demand environment. Assumed 
challenges for CLTs, both newfound and well-established, may involve formal incorporation, 
locating properties, acquiring properties, financing preservation or development, organization 
both within the corporation and the community, sustainably maintaining affordability, and 
political viability of the model. Yet in order to truly grasp the successes and setbacks of the 
movement, what is necessary to overcome these setbacks, and what the future might look like, 
we turn to those most invested and at the front lines of organization, education, and advocacy for 
affordability and community control through CLTs. Through this research, we are able to 
approach our third research question on the challenges faced by the CLT movement, and what 
can potentially alleviate them. 
Each interview was conducted in person or over the phone, recorded by the interviewer 
with the written consent of the interviewee. Where statements are associated with names of 
individuals as well as organizations, written consent was also acquired. Interviews were 
conducted from January through March of 2020. Questions asked to the interviewee were rooted 
around the following topics: the founding and history of the organization and their involvement 
in CLTs; how their CLT work is structured and what are their goals; the major challenges they 
face as an organization and a CLT; what is needed from the city to support their organization and 
the movement at large; what the future looks like for their organization and the movement at 
large. These questions were adapted to each organization and amended depending on how the 
conversation progressed. For organizations that were not operating CLTs, such as HPD or 
Councilwoman Rivera’s offices, questions were altered accordingly. 
Finally, as an ongoing component of this project, significant time has been allotted to the 
development of an online mapping tool, theoretically utilized by CLT organizations to locate 
city-owned property ripe for acquisition. This mapping tool was created using the R 
programming language, with data collected from New York City’s open data portal. Further 
explanation is provided in the ​Final Recommendations ​section. 
 




In its most basic form, the subjects discussed in this paper questions how we situate 
ourselves in relation to the land we occupy. This relationship has been a contested one 
throughout the history of the country, and one that has gone on to define our own identity as 
individuals and as a nation.  Our current urban property politics, how our housing market 
functions, what and who is included and excluded, and how current systems might evolve and 
fluctuate in the future, are all informed by the past, the fundamentals of American property, and 
who it has served. We can observe how property has been used to exclude, manipulate, or 
oppress certain populations through the founding of the country and seizure of land from 
indigenous populations (Price, 1995), as well as the property dynamics of the slave plantation, 
the continuing disenfranchisement of particularly low-income people of color during the 20th 
century (Freund, 2007; Shlay, 2006; Herbin-Triant, 2019), and the ongoing disparities in 
ownership and housing access we see today. 
Property has traditionally been considered in the United States as either public or private. 
The American landscape consists of private properties, the home, the factory, the business, and 
public lands, the street, perhaps the park. Some have explored this duality and its complications. 
The current dynamic of private and public greatly favors the former, to the point of abuse, where 
capitalist frameworks have heavily invested in private property as the main means of designating 
land (Ellerman, 2016; Tabachnik, 2016; Price, 1995). However it is important to complicate this 
dynamic, as some have done (Ellerman, 2016). It is somewhere in between these two that 
shared-equity models inhabit, as they are not the private single family home, nor are they public 
space, but a collaboration of privacy and collectivism. 
Blends of public and private are particularly pertinent in urban contexts, one whose social 
and spatial politics have been studied perhaps most famously by Henri Lefebvre and David 
Harvey. The two champion the city as something inherently belonging to the public, but has 
instead been co-opted by the private sector through exclusion and surveillance (Lefebvre, 2006; 
Harvey, 2013). Their right to the city ideology arguably sets the stage for practices like 
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shared-equity ownership, the use of residential property strictly for the people, not for profit or 
speculation. 
Some would argue that collective or public housing is thoroughly antithetical to how a 
capitalist property system operates, requiring a greater paradigm shift in how we address housing 
as an ideology (Madden & Marcuse, 2016). Finally, Bryan (2000) writes about how concepts of 
property can vary so widely between cultures. Property, how we relate to the land, how we claim 
it as our own and distribute and marketize it accordingly, is often forgotten as something entirely 
subjective, rather overlooked as inherent to what it means to be human. Bryan investigates how 
indigenous peoples of Canada have regarded land and possession, wholly complex as they are, 
reflect differences not just in legality or political preference, but outlook, sense of self, and 
ontology. These inquiries and critiques situate our conversation by establishing dominant 
housing models as not inherent or absolute, but in flux, unstable, and socially constructed. With 
this in mind, we can view alternative models as not something born to the fringes of housing, but 
something reflective of a certain ideology, or ontology, that can be challenged and changed. 
Regarding community land trusts, there are several aspects of the model that have been 
discussed in previous literature, including their intersections with and impact on affordability, 
community control, and government intervention in the model. Additionally, several case studies 
can be explored in which policies have been implemented to support community land trusts, 
followed by further analysis of the crucial moment of government intervention in activism rooted 
in resistance to government policy and actions. 
 
Community Land Trusts and Affordability 
Since the CLT model first entered the urban landscape, it has been primarily utilized to 
address the growing issue of affordability in cities, specifically that of housing. The model 
clearly identifies affordability as a core goal, as such a goal is one most often held by the 
communities who control the CLT. Through the model, property is essentially removed from the 
real estate market, sacrificing speculation and potential wealth accumulation for the preservation 
of affordability and accessibility to future tenants and community members. While this holds as 
an accepted tenet of the model, some have investigated both the details of affordability in 
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different markets, as well as studied impacts of the model on complex affordability issues such 
as gentrification. Curtin and Bocarsly (2008) analyze how the model can preserve affordability 
through fluctuations of the market. In “boom times” the model can maximize the benefit of 
limited subsidies by ensuring permanent affordability, while removing cost of land from the 
expenses of developing affordable housing. In “bad times” the model can stabilize the market by 
preventing predatory lending practices and promote affordable homeownership for those 
marginalized by the traditional housing market particularly during periods of recession. 
In terms of realization and impact, one study demonstrates how CLTs partnered with 
limited-equity cooperatives sustainable served households far below even the targeted 
affordability levels (Ehlenz, 2014). Through stringent caps on income, relatively low share costs, 
and little to no equity built upon transfer of units, studied CLT-LEC examples thoroughly proved 
the models capacity to preserve affordability. Both Semuels (2015) and Fireside (2010) found 
that a crucial component of the model in distinguishing it from other top-down affordability 
strategies is its permanent nature. While many mechanisms employed by cities around the 
country have expiration dates that continue to decrease dramatically the amount of affordable 
housing stock, Ehlenz, Semuels, and Fireside, as well as Abromowitz and White (2010), 
demonstrate the model’s unique means of surpassing others schemes. 
Further literature has assessed the model’s ability to confront growing trends of 
gentrification in urban areas (Choi, 2015; Choi, Van Zandt, & Matarrita-Cascante, 2018). In both 
cases, CLTs were found to have a negative relationship with gentrification trends, demonstrating 
that the model can act to both prevent and slow displacement through greater community agency, 
protections of affordability, and the disruption of speculation practices. 
 
Community Land Trusts and Community Control 
In addition to affordability, and perhaps more so, the concept of community control 
serves as a guiding principle of the community land trust model. Some have studied how the 
models origins are rooted in this idea of communally owned land and this idea alone (DeFilippis, 
Stromberg, & Williams, 2018; Williams, 2019). While affordability became a concern especially 
once the model was adapted to urban settings, original applications of the model did not even 
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concern housing, but rather sought alternative ownership models to protect rural workers within 
farming collectives and other contexts. Community control of land finds roots in the Lockean 
theory of property ownership for those who work the land, as discussed previously. Meehan 
(2014) writes how the CLT model is a social invention closely related to experiments with 
employee ownership and industrial democracy, where workers have greater control of not only 
their own labor but the company itself and its value. This ideology contests the capitalist 
dynamic of employee and employer, or tenant and landlord, joining the two as a more pure 
interpretation of Locke and a more democratic system of property ownership and governance. 
What is important here is the CLT members’ ability to control what happens to the land, 
despite what that might be. Despite the model’s varying interpretations and adaptations across 
the globe, community control and empowerment through the democratization of land ownership 
has been an essential focus of each, despite different means of approaching or defining its 
realization. Baiocchi, Brady, and Carlson (2018) have promoted the model as a prominent means 
of achieving community-owned, democratically controlled housing, among limited-equity 
cooperatives and other international methods. Gray and Galande (2011) found that through their 
case study of one urban CLT in the southern United States, legitimacy of community 
empowerment and representation was rooted in the organization’s ability to conduct local 
outreach and engagement efforts throughout its work and existence. Several other studies have 
delved into the topic of community control and representation, as well as the model’s apparent 
shortcomings in preserving this crucial component, which will be discussed in the following 
section. 
 
Limitations and Critiques 
The model has not evaded all critique, especially in its later iterations. Aside from those 
who do not view community control of land as a means of adequately preserving affordability or 
desire serious land reform or democratization of property, skeptics of the model question its 
ability to uphold its own origins, and its ability to sufficiently separate itself from other 
community development frameworks that ultimately fall to corporate leanings in their own 
grassroots movements. These critiques rather point out challenges to the model that, when left 
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unaddressed, can push the model far from its original intentions, serving as nothing more than 
another form of ownership with no ties to radical property ideology. 
Curtin and Bocarsly (2008) point out several issues that arise with the model, firstly 
concerning the governing structure of the organization. While the tripartite structure of 
governance, consisting of tenants, community members, and professionals from the general 
public, has been well established by advocates such as the Institute for Community Economics. 
CLTs are also meant to be independent nonprofit organizations with member bodies. However, 
not all CLT in the United States have proven to follow these guidelines, with some existing as 
tools of larger organizations with no independent governing body or members. Curtin and 
Bocarsly also shed light on the conflict between wealth accumulation and resale caps. Most 
CLTs adopt a formula for capping equity built in a CLT through resale formulae in order to 
preserve affordability of each property. However, some may argue that this in fact disempowers 
residents, who no longer have the power to build wealth through their homes. 
The major critique, that of community representation through the model, is addressed 
through several perspectives. Williams (2018) points to the model’s roots in the Civil Rights 
Movement, the grassroots organizing and advocacy of disadvantaged communities, particularly 
black farmers in the South, that led to the model’s proliferation across the country and in urban 
areas as a housing tool. Somewhere along this timeline, Williams accuses the movement of 
forgetting its history, devolving into “an economically efficient affordable housing strategy, 
rather than an organizational approach that empowers poor, working-class, and marginalized 
people to take control of the land they occupy” (2018). The movement has drifted from radical 
grassroots to corporate nonprofit over the years, expanding perhaps only due to its palatability 
for existing Community Development Corporations and other vaguely ethical housing 
developers. Moore and McKee add to this skepticism by noting that “there is also a lack of 
critical insight into the governance practices and relations that take place within American CLTs, 
including the connections CLTs have with the wider local, regional and national context, and the 
role and influence of residents and community members” (2012, p. 286). 
Finally, DeFilippis et al. (2018) discuss this loss of community empowerment as a 
concern not just for CLT residents but for the potential of the model itself. They not how as a 
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nonprofit, a CLT can face innumerable challenges related to funding and organizational survival 
that can shift its actions away from the core values, like community control, it supposedly 
champions. While some CLTs were never rooted in this ideal, others are pushed, through their 
desire to expand and thrive, into a watered down superficiality. DeFilippis et al. conclude with a 
provocation: “If the community control component of the community land trust model continues 
on its apparent journey to the island of forgotten social reforms, then not only will the CLT 
movement have lost its soul, but we will have also witnessed the undermining of an opportunity 
for real political economic reform and social justice in communities in the United States” (2018, 
p. 766). From this perspective, the CLT model is important because of its separation from other 
strategies as a uniquely grassroots model defined by its capacity to empower disadvantaged 
communities. Yet if this is lost, and the model succumbs to its popularity, then there will be 
nothing to distinguish it, and no power to be found in the communities it intends to serve. 
 
Community Land Trusts and the City 
(Thaden, 2018; Jacobus & Brown, 2010; Davis & Jacobus, 2008; Choi, 2015) 
One aspect of the movement, the primary focus of this study, is that of city involvement in 
supporting the model. While CLTs were first devised in the United States as rural collectives, 
much of the movement has shifted toward urban areas, where land contestation and affordability 
are increasingly contentious subjects. City’s are beginning to lean into the CLT model, primarily 
as a means of preserving or creating affordable housing, but the question remains whether this 
intervention helps or harms the movement and its core values. A dynamic that has guided and 
informs much of this research occurs between the grassroots CLT movement and the growing 
support of municipalities. What is needed, what does city intervention look like, and what are 
some hesitations around such intervention? 
Some see the city-CLT partnership as necessary in expanding the movement or even 
proving its potential in cities where land is expensive and development costs are even higher. 
Thaden (2018) found that interviewees within the movement believe this to be the case, that 
municipalities have a unique power to streamline the process of CLT growth and success. This is 
certainly happening as the model becomes more popular, and some are happily welcoming the 
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support, regardless of the regulations that may come. Jacobus and Brown (2007) trace the history 
of such intervention, highlighting its recent burgeoning as a model deemed viable by cities and 
the shifts made by both governments and grassroots organizations to take on this partnership. 
They find the interest from cities deriving from increasing need of long term affordability with 
relatively low subsidy, as well as a mechanism stewarding affordable housing to lighten the 
responsibility of the city. Through case studies in Irvine, California and Chicago, Illinois, 
Jacobus and Brown shed light on the financial and expansionary potential of city involvement, 
alongside the challenges of prioritizing and accurately representing local communities. As 
municipal governments certainly hold agendas differing from local constituents or organizations 
traditionally operating CLTs, city sponsorship poses an ongoing conflict between the push for 
citywide affordability measures and grassroots coalition building and organizing. 
Davis and Jacobus (2008) further analyze how growing city intervention will ultimately 
alter the CLT model as the partnership develops. They find that today municipalities are not only 
supporting CLT organizing and community-based activism around the model, but introducing 
and implementing it themselves. This comes with challenges to the community control aspect of 
the model, interrogating to what extent a city can be involved without deflating the agency of its 
constituents. David and Jacobus write, “Especially in neighborhoods scarred by urban renewal or 
municipal neglect, residents may regard a CLT started by local government with suspicion and 
leave the program with little support in the larger community” (2008, p. 536). Further, 
“Particularly when a local government starts a CLT expressly to enhance the effectiveness and 
longevity of its affordable housing investments, it is unlikely to take a more comprehensive 
approach to community development and community empowerment” (2008, pp. 536-37). In this 
way, this literature finds such involvement of municipal governments antithetical to the model 
tenets of community control and community empowerment, ultimately threatening the potential 
of the model itself. Davis and Jacobus ultimately regard this intervention as beneficial in some 
respects and perhaps inevitable, suggesting that a shift to stewardship over municipally governed 
CLT property may be the solution to finding balance between the city and the community. This 
view, however, may not be satisfactory to some, as it requires alteration within the CLT model 
and the communities involved in the face of unstoppable municipal policy. The only way for the 
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model to survive is for it to adapt, rather than demand the city to lessen its interventionist 
practices in favor of a truly community-driven model. 
Such tension between new government support and the preservation of community 
control is not unique to the CLT movement. Radical political ideologies often confront local 
government agendas, navigating a balance of grassroots identity, reliable funding, political 
viability, and mainstream conformity that can easily hollow out a once powerful movement. A 
comparable example is that of the squatter movement across Western Europe, which has seen 
some success in allocating sections of central urban areas to experimental communal occupation, 
but has certainly confronted the complexities of interacting with their respective municipalities, 
and how negotiations may very well in their existence divest from the original, anti-state 
sentiments core to the squatter ideology. As Pruijt (2013) explains, particularly in the case of 
political squatting, the act of squatting is one that is intentionally anti-systemic, a manifestation 
of revolutionary or anti-state sentiment. As squatting is an act of political resistance, one that is 
predicated on a contestation with the power of the state, any point of bargaining, let alone 
collaboration, between these opponents can serve to disempower the movement itself. Using the 
case of the Kalenderpanden in Amsterdam, Uitermark (2004) asserts that squatter settlements are 
quite prone to co-optation by city governments through legalization, strategic tourism, and 
institutionalization Drawing on a broader literature of modern social movements, those which 
collaborate with the state inherently “lose their subversive identity” (2004, p. 688). 
Examples of similar scenarios exist in community land trusts in both Europe and the 
United States. Case studies of both the East London Community Land Trust (Bunce, 2016) and 
the Cooper Square Community Land Trust (Angotti, 2007) demonstrate how some CLTs born 
out of grassroots organizing have been able to maintain roots to constituents in the midst of 
ongoing city involvement. Both cases illustrate how strategic negotiating, bargaining, and 
political lobbying have successfully garnered city support through land transfer and public 
subsidy while maintaining community agency and fending off a government takeover of the 
model. Both organizations utilized strategic partnerships with other organizations and political 
allies, in addition to ongoing organizing and capacity building, to sway local governments in 
support of their missions without co-opting the movement. The efficacy of these collaborations is 
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certainly debatable given the argument that any government intervention is regarded as 
co-optation and removal of the originally subversive and revolutionary nature of the movement. 
This relationship, between the grassroots community identity of the CLT movement and 
the interventionist, top-down planning inherent to city government, is at the crux of this paper. 
Navigating the complexities of such support, collaboration, or co-optation is the purpose of this 
project, understanding whether government intervention is necessary, and what it might look like 
without disinvesting from the model’s core value of community control of land. With this 
research, using New York City as a case study, I hope to add to the body of literature that 
























What is a Community Land Trust? 
A Community Land Trust (CLT) is a type of communal ownership, or shared-equity, 
model that can serve many purposes and have many motivations behind its establishment. For 
the purposes of this paper, the two most important motivations are to maintain affordability and 
community control of land. The exact manifestation of a CLT takes various forms defined by its 
context and the intentions of its members. Each CLT follows a core structure, rooted by the 
separation of land and what is built. 
Oksana Mironova, a housing policy analyst and advocate at the Community Service 
Society, provides a comprehensive explanation of CLTs that we will use as a working definition 
(Mironova, 2014). Traditionally, a piece of land and what permanently occupies that property, 
like a building, are under the same ownership, constituting a property. A CLT aims to separate 
the two, taking ownership of the land, effectively determining control of what is developed 
without necessarily owning those developments. CLTs are operated by the local community, 
with the intention of removing land and property from the real estate market and potential 
speculation. If the community owns a plot land, then it can not only preserve the affordability of 
that land but decide what happens to it. Where landowners traditionally depend on the increase in 
value of property to build equity, CLTs own land not for financial security or gain but to ensure 
that such a limited resource is preserved for the purposes of the community, whatever those may 
be. The purpose of the land is not to resell it, but theoretically to own it forever. 
A CLT operates as a non-profit community-based organization, an incorporated entity 
that can purchase and own land as a single entity, with members owning shares of the 
organization, hence the term “shared-equity.” John Emmeus Davis of the National Housing 
Institute details the shared-equity framework of a CLT, defining it as a “dual ownership model” 
with nearly the same functionality as a deed-restricted home or a limited-equity cooperative 
(Davis, 2006). Controls on equity building, affordability, and other restrictions on the 
development that does occur are enforced through a ground lease, a contract allowing another 
organization to develop on the land under the legal supervision of the CLT. A ground lease 
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typically runs for 99 years with the intended option to renew. Typical lessees of CLTs can be 
individual homeowners, mutual housing associations, community development corporations, or 
cooperatives. Restrictions included within a ground lease vary, but generally focus on the 
maintenance of affordability of the property, often enforced through prohibited subletting, caps 
on equity, and pre-established targeted income brackets and qualifications for those occupying 
the development. 
Membership within the CLT is generally open to any adult member of the community, or 
resident within the local geographic area, in addition to the residents of the property. The board 
of directors, the group that actually operates the CLT, typically comprises three parts: one third 
elected residents, one third elected community members, and one third “professionals” appointed 
by the other two thirds. Formation of the board may differ by CLT, but this ratio is generally 
considered crucial to the CLT framework. This structure is meant to balance short-term interests 
of residents, long-term interests of community members, and technical expertise and resources of 
professionals in housing development, finance, organizing and other related fields. 
It is important to recognize that the structures, purposes, and actions of CLTs vary 
depending on their contexts and the actors who guide them. The definition is arguably 
intentionally broad to allow for adaptability to different environments and uses. If we think of the 
CLT as a simple model with the intentions of maintaining affordability and community control 
of land, then further details are implemented simply to ensure and strengthen the realization of 
these core goals. 
 
History of Community Land Trusts in the United States 
One cannot fully understand how the CLT operates today in places like New York City 
without learning the history of the model, its evolutions and adaptations into what we can 
recognize today as community control of land. In another piece, John Emmeus Davis details the 
history of the model in the United States, finding its roots in the American South during the Civil 
Rights movement. What may be difficult to interpret today from current iterations of the model is 
its complex history, grounded in racialized and class-oriented contests over land, pushing against 
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John Stuart Mill’s ideals of land appreciation and expanding Lockean theories of labor and 
ownership to justify the establishment of an agricultural land collective. 
Inspired by Henry George, several “single-tax colonies” emerged in the United States 
around the turn of the 20th century, where quasi-governmental corporations issue a single tax on 
the appreciating value of land to eliminate what wealth was accumulated by property owners and 
redirect it toward the public good (Davis, 2014). These models slowly took the form of 
municipal trusts, where the city owned the land and leased it out to homeowners and other 
entities, forming essential whole towns of nationalized property in places like Alabama and 
Delaware. Activists like Ralph Borsodi, Bob Swann, and Slater King, a cousin of Martin Luther 
King Jr., expanded this movement, decrying private property as unnatural and establishing their 
own societies around the country rooted in collective land stewardship. 
While these early experiments certainly confronted private property theory and 
established replicable alternatives to it, they did not necessarily carry the same “communal” or 
social justice qualities of a contemporary CLT. Their collectivist strategies were relatively 
insular, solely benefiting the residents of the included property rather than expanding to the 
greater community or striving toward a greater public good. Inspired by the Gramdan movement 
in India led by Vinoba Bhave, Borsodi, Swann, and King sought to establish a land ownership 
model truly embedded in and driven by the local community. After India’s independence from 
British rule in 1947, spiritual leader Vinoba Bhave created village land trusts across rural India, 
where land was held in trust by a village council and leased to farmers. Borsodi brought this 
model to the United States, where Swann and King hoped to adapt it to the rural South, 
specifically where black farmers were at risk of losing their land to speculation and development. 
In 1969, New Communities Inc. was founded as “a non-profit organization to hold land 
in perpetual trust for the permanent use of rural communities” (Davis, 2014, 24). Outside of 
Albany, Georgia, New Communities was able to acquire over 5,000 acres of farmland and 
woodland to be owned by and leased to local black farmers. This was the first working example 
of the modern community land trust, an adaptation of earlier experimental models that 
emphasized greater control by the broader community. Despite its final foreclosure in 1985 due 
to racist pressures from surrounding white communities, elected officials, and discriminatory 
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practices by lenders, New Communities realized a new ownership structure that changed how we 
engage with the land and how we engage with one another, setting the stage for a national 
movement to preserve affordability and community control of one of our most basic and limited 
resources. 
What this history tells us is that the community land trust model is one rooted in the civil 
rights movement. It shares a common narrative of displacement and disenfrachisement of people 
of color, particularly black southerners, through disproportionate allocation of resources and 
multi-level discrimination through private markets and public policy. The origins of the 
community land trust are born out of necessity, of means of survival and reclamation of rights 
and representation. Harking back to Locke’s theory that whoever works the land has a right to its 
ownership, the activists of the CLT movement retrofitted this core American value where it was 
not meant to apply. If the marginalized individual cannot exercise these rights, then maybe a 
collective can. 
An important draw from this history is that the origin of the community land trust is 
found in the rural black South, a context far from that of New York City. The challenges facing 
CLTs of the city are perhaps not specific to New York, but inherent in its original purposes. 
These origins must be carried throughout understanding of the modern CLT movement, its 
barriers, and its participants, as its history should and will undoubtedly define its present. 
 
Community Land Trusts Across the Country 
Since New Communities Inc. The CLT model has spread throughout the United States, 
proving to be a replicable model for affordability and community control of land in a plethora of 
different contexts. Beginning in the 1970s, CLTs adapted to different scenarios but all sharing 
the same core goals cropped up in places like eastern Tennessee and northern Maine. These two, 
the Woodland Community Land Trust and the Covenant CLT, were formed by rural low-income 
groups to sustain themselves in the wake of job loss and unnecessary pressures from traditional 
corporate landowners (Davis, 2014). The CLT model was a means of empowering communities 
who could not otherwise control land or build wealth, while simultaneously reflecting the needs 
of the community as a whole. 
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The model found its first urban application in 1980 in Cincinnati, Ohio. Established in the 
West End neighborhood by the West End Alliance of Churches and Ministries, the Community 
Land Cooperative of Cincinnati (CLCC) was meant for the same purposes as New Communities 
Inc., but in an urban setting. The West End neighborhood, Cincinnati’s oldest black community, 
had been historically marginalized, exempt of any political power or capital as was the case with 
many black urban communities at the time. The Alliance saw the CLT model as a viable 
mechanism for controlling the development of the area as well as maintaining affordability 
(Davis, 2014). This was the first instance where control of resale prices and the core goal of 
keeping property affordable in perpetuity was incorporated into a CLT, explicitly utilizing the 
model in the fight against gentrification. 
As urban areas primarily across the Northeast and Midwest began to confront issues of 
physical deterioration and abandonment as well as gentrification and displacement, the CLT 
model proved to directly confront these issues facing low-income urban communities of color. 
As the model shifted to address not only community ownership, but community development 
and affordability, more and more CLTs cropped up in urban areas. Two of the most well-known 
and successful early urban CLTs are the Champlain Housing Trust in Burlington, Vermont and 
Dudley Neighbors Inc. in Boston, Massachusetts. 
In Burlington, the Burlington Community Land Trust was founded in 1984 as an 
experimental and collaborative project by local activists and the City of Burlington. The 
organization’s primary objective was to provide and promote affordable homeownership options 
for local residents who could not otherwise own a home. Initially with a $200,000 grant 
proposed by then mayor of Burlington Bernie Sanders, the trust has merged with the Lake 
Champlain Housing Development Corporation to form the Champlain Housing Trust (CHT), and 
has grown to be the largest CLT in the nation (Davis & Stokes, 2009). CHT currently manages 
2,300 apartments and stewards 620 owner-occupied homes, as well as providing services such as 
homebuyer education and financial counseling (Champlain Housing Trust Website). While 
Burlington is a relatively small city, CHT has proved to provide affordable owner-occupied and 
rental housing in an urban setting, utilizing the traditional CLT community ownership and 
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governance model (Davis & Demetrowitz, 2003; Davis & Stokes, 2009; Temkin, Theodos & 
Price, 2010). 
In Boston, the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative established Dudley Neighbors Inc. 
(DNI) in 1989 “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, and developing land for the revitalization 
of a multi-racial residential neighborhood” in the Roxbury neighborhood (Davis, 2014, 38). Also 
benefiting from public funding, DNI arose to contest top-down planning of Roxbury and to 
instead ensure development that reflected the needs and desires of the community itself. Yet 
unlike the origins of CHT, DNI prioritized its role of empowering the Roxbury community to 
develop its neighborhood not just through affordable housing but however they deem necessary, 
expanding the urban CLT model beyond residential uses. DNI now controls over 30 acres of 
formerly vacant land now containing 225 affordable homes, a greenhouse, an urban farm, a 
playground, gardens, and other amenities demanded and realized by the community (Dudley 
Neighbors Inc. Website). The DNI model has been acutely analyzed by many, generally regarded 
as a successful CLT rooted in a central, high-demand area of a larger city (Medoff & Sklar, 
1994). 
The explosion in popularity of the CLT model, as well as some critical funding for early 
non-profits like CLCC, can be attributed in large part to the Institute for Community Economics, 
Borsodi’s project to educate and empower marginalized communities both urban and rural 
through collective land ownership. In addition to the early experimental models and New 
Communities Inc., both Champlain Housing Trust and Dudley Neighbors Inc. were greatly 
influenced both ideologically and organizationally by the Institute and the work and theory they 
championed. Beginning as a tool for rural black farmers to reclaim the land they toiled and to 
build wealth among their communities, the model quickly gained traction in a host of 
environments, eventually making its way to the densest and richest urban areas of the country as 
a means for low-income disempowered communities to stay in place and even thrive despite the 
real estate pressures that dominate our housing landscape today. 
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NEW YORK CITY CONTEXT 
 
The City’s Housing Landscape 
New York City consists of a variety of different housing types. Despite its image as an 
extraordinarily dense built environment, Queens and Staten Island follow more closely the single 
family, detached, owner-occupied typology while the Bronx, Manhattan, and most of Brooklyn 
are defined by denser, multifamily, renter-occupied homes. Despite a popular conception, 
Manhattan has the highest vacancy rate of any borough at 13.3 percent, a statistic that is difficult 
to assess but arguably is caused by high rents, a concentration of city-owned properties, and 
trends of speculation. 
The average renter-owner rate across the five boroughs is 62.4 percent to 37.6 percent, 
however the ratio varies significantly per borough. While Brooklyn, Manhattan, and the Bronx 
contain renter-occupied rates of 70, 75.9, and 80.4 percent respectively, Queens and Staten 
Island have rates of only 55.4 and 30.3 percent. According to city data, 2019 saw 18,647 
residential and commercial evictions across the city. While this is a decrease from eviction rates 
the past two years, that number still equates to over 50 evictions per day on average. 
According to the Coalition for the Homeless and the Department of Homeless Services, 
nearly 63,000 people were registered in the city’s homeless shelter system at the end of 2019 
(Coalition for the Homeless, 2019). This number has tripled in the last 30 years, and does not 
include the countless individuals living outside formal housing and the shelter system. The 
coalition’s research also shows that the primary cause of homelessness in the city is a lack of 
affordable housing, with compounding issues such as eviction, overcrowding, and hazardous 
housing conditions (Coalition for the Homeless). 
Indicators of an inadequate housing system, one that does not reflect the economic needs 
or capacities of its residents, can vary, but tend to involve increases in rent compared to income, 
eviction and homelessness rates, as well as rates of rent burden. In the case of Manhattan, 
median gross rent increased by an average of 3.9 percent every year from 2010 to 2018, while 
median household income increased by only 3.0 percent every year within the same timespan, 
demonstrating how rent is outpacing income in even the city’s wealthiest borough. Eviction and 
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homelessness are also considerable issues in New York. While the city has made significant 
efforts to curtail illegal evictions and provide legal assistance for those thrown into housing court 
by their landlords, over 50 evictions occur every day. Homelessness in the city is a continuing 
issue that has not seemed to lessen despite city efforts to provide deeper tenant protections, more 
shelters, and expand homeless housing programs. 
 
 
Rent burden across the five boroughs (ACS data) 
 
With these statistics in mind, there are a plethora of affordability practices and programs 
in place in the city, several covering hundreds of thousands of residents. Some estimate that over 
half of New York City’s housing units are in some form or another designated as “affordable,” 
having received some sort of public financial or zoning assistance in exchange for some 
restriction on rent (Anuta, 2016). Others, like the Furman Center, have estimated a majority of 
properties and residential units to fall under at least one subsidy or tax abatement, as just a 
handful of these mechanisms have served and continue to serve as the city’s main driver’s of 
residential affordability. 
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Subsidized housing in the city (Furman Center data) 
 
The City’s Affordability Strategies 
As is apparent in the previous section, the city employs a plethora of strategies to address 
housing affordability. Tax abatements, direct and indirect subsidies, tax credits, vouchers, and 
publicly constructed and managed housing are all implemented at large scales across the five 
boroughs. Yet as New York continues to boast some of the highest rents in the country, each city 
administration adopts its own rigorous housing agenda, with the current mayor perhaps having 
the most ambitious plan to date in terms of sheer scale. In 2014, Mayor de Blasio’s ​Housing New 
York​ plan initially set out to construct and preserve 200,000 affordable units in ten years. To 
accomplish this, the city would utilize its powerful zoning tools to rezone neighborhoods across 
the city for more residential density and to implement the new Mandatory Inclusionary Housing 
(MIH) policy requiring certain percentages of affordable units in exchange for a greater Floor to 
Area Ratio (FAR), allowing for even greater density. 
Seeing as the city has been on track to complete its initial goal of 200,000 units ahead of 
time, in 2017 updated its target year to 2022 with an additional 100,000 units to be completed by 
2026 through its ​Housing New York 2.0​ plan. This new iteration of ​Housing New York​ is meant 
to further the efforts of the original plan while acknowledging the ongoing needs of deeper 
affordability and more dynamic strategies to address the housing needs of all New Yorkers. 
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While MIH through rezoning continues to be a main focus of the plan, it also includes initiatives 
addressing senior housing, Mitchell-Lama housing, supportive housing, micro apartments and 
tiny homes, vacant lots, and homeowner needs.  
The plan also establishes two new programs to address deep affordability and housing 
security, the Extremely Low- and Low-Income Affordability Program (ELLA) and the 
Neighborhood Pillars Program. ELLA establishes new construction subsidies specifically for 
developments with at least 80 percent of units at or below 80 percent of Area Median Income 
(AMI), and 15 percent of units set aside for the formerly homeless (NYC HPD Website). The 
Neighborhood Pillars program aims to financially assist local non-profits and community based 
organizations in the acquisition and rehabilitation of rent-regulated apartment buildings with the 
intention of maintaining affordability (Housing New York 2.0). 
 
Critiques 
While much of Mayor de Blasio’s housing plan seems sound in theory, many housing 
experts and advocates have rallied against the approach for several reasons. By the laws of 
supply and demand, it seems logical to increase housing supply to drive overall costs down, 
while a mandatory affordability percentage ensures that at least a portion of those new units are 
below market rate. Yet opponents argue that the plan does not target the deepest levels of 
affordability, lacks the necessary percentage of required affordable units, does not ensure 
permanent affordability, and can lead to gentrification in low-income neighborhoods of color 
disproportionately targeted for rezonings (Anuta, 2019; Spivack, 2019b). Overall, critics, 
including Comptroller Stringer (Murphy, 2018), point to the administration’s disproportionate 
emphasis on quantity over quality or depth of affordable housing as its weak point in effectively 
addressing rent burden and homelessness. 
The plan’s major critique, one carried primarily by news outlets and activists, asks for a 
greater portion of affordable units targeting homeless and extremely low-income populations 
who are arguably the most in need of secure housing (Ricciulli, 2019). One report by the 
Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development in 2019 found that while the 42 
percent of units developed through October 2019 as apart of ​Housing New York​ were for 
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Low-Income households, the same percentage of the city’s population is made up of Very Low- 
and Extremely Low-Income households who cannot afford those new units (Sosa-Kalter, 2019). 
Another important finding by ANHD considered how the issue of deep affordability differed 
among developments by nonprofit and for-profit organizations. While for-profit developers 
accounted for 75 percent of new construction units in 2018, only 18 percent of these units were 
designated for Extremely Low-Income households. On the other hand, nonprofit developers 
designated 35 percent of their new units to the same income brackets, illustrating how under the 
same constraints and incentives, mission-based non-profits took the extra step to provide 
perfectly financially feasible housing for those who need it most (Sosa-Kalter, 2019). 
As rents continue to rise faster than incomes (Spivack, 2019a), the city continues to rely 
on the private real estate market to provide the affordable housing needed by so many New 
Yorkers. However, the affordability crisis continues to deepen, while definitions of affordability 
ignore race (Zevallos, 2019) and skew to more middle-income households. Hundreds of 
thousands of “affordable units” will expire in the next two decades (Sosa-Kalter, 2019), and most 
of the ​Housing New York​ plan is aimed at simply preserving this housing. Some argue that these 
critiques, the plan’s failure to address the depth of affordability needed and its contributions to 
gentrification, are inherent to its neoliberal design (Stein, 2018). If we are to truly provide 
housing that suits the city’s local financial and social needs and desires, then maybe relying on 
the private market to provide and distribute something as essential as housing is an inherently 
ineffective approach. 
An important finding by the Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development in 
2019 considered how this issue of deep affordability differed among developments by nonprofit 
and for-profit organizations. While for-profit developers accounted for 75 percent of new 
construction units in 2018, only 18 percent of these units were designated for Extremely 
Low-Income households. On the other hand, nonprofit developers designated 35 percent of their 
new units to the same income brackets, illustrating how under the same constraints and 
incentives, mission-based nonprofits took the extra step to provide perfectly financially feasible 
housing for those who need it most (Sosa-Kalter, 2019). 
 
Allerton | 29 
 
Community Land Trusts in New York City 
While New York City’s government agencies and real estate industry have invested in 
certain policies to promote affordable housing, most notably tax incentives, subsidies, and 
historically public housing, grassroots methods have a substantial history in the city. The housing 
crisis in the city is not new, as New York has had high rates of homelessness, tenant-landlord 
conflicts, and infamously high rents for decades. As such community-led organizations have 
been active in the sphere of housing justice for as long as these issues have persisted. While 
some have advocated for more rent control, deeper tenant protections, and larger subsidies, 
others have created their own solutions through organizing and education of alternative models. 
In the late 20th century, New York City was not immune to the teachings of the Institute 
for Community Economics and New Communities Inc. One organization that discovered the 
Community Land Trust model as a means of addressing the issues of affordability and 
community control of land use was the Cooper Square Committee (Cooper Square) of the Lower 
East Side of Manhattan. Cooper Square began as a resistance project against the city’s urban 
renewal plans led by Robert Moses. The Slum Clearance plan was initiated to raze areas of the 
city considered “blighted,” the Lower East Side low-income tenement buildings being a large 
target of more palatable redevelopment. In 1959 community activists, residents, business owners, 
and artists formed Cooper Square, proposing their own Alternate Plan in the  following years 
defending minimal displacement, incremental development, and prioritization of existing 
residents. These tenets would define the organization’s work and their eventual adoption of the 
CLT model as a means of achieving resident control and community preservation. 
After decades of work in community organizing and shepherding the city’s preservation 
and development efforts, Cooper Square redesigned its approach through the founding of the 
Cooper Square Mutual Housing Association (CSMHA) and the Cooper Square Community Land 
Trust (CSCLT) in the 1990s. These dual organizations allowed Cooper Square to focus more on 
preserving and developing its own portfolio of affordable housing rather than relying on the city. 
At the same time Cooper Square was able to negotiate the transfer of 20 buildings targeted for 
urban renewal into its own ownership, with CSMHA managing the buildings and CSCLT 
owning and leasing the land. This ownership structure, with some overlap between the boards of 
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the MHA and the CLT, is designed to maximize accountability, with CSCLT able to dictate the 
actions and responsibilities of CSMHA through its ground lease regulations. Today, the two 
organizations operate 328 affordable, cooperatively-owned apartments. THe structure is so 
successful that while the CLT ground lease requires households be at or below 80 percent of 
Area Median Income, in reality affordability levels range from 28 to 36 percent AMI. 
While Cooper Square has for decades upheld the model as a very possible alternative to 
the larger top-down affordability mechanisms put in place by the city, the CLT movement has 
certainly grown across the five boroughs in recent years. Community organizations and residents 
around the city have begun to consider CLTs as an appropriate strategy to combat gentrification 
and empower local communities. As CLTs have continued to crop up across the city, several key 
steps have been taken at the city level to embrace this grassroots action. 
In January 2017, the CLT movement was first acknowledged by the city through a 
Request for Expression of Interest (RFEI) put out by the NYC Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (HPD) and the de Blasio administration for groups interested in 
forming Community Land Trusts (Savitch-Lew, 2017a). This action followed significant 
pressure from community organizations and coalitions such as the New York City Community 
Land Initiative (NYCCLI), demonstrating grassroots organization and energy and calling for the 
city’s support, having fallen behind other US cities in embracing the model (Savitch-Lew, 2016). 
The RFEI was met with responses from a host of organizations either interested in or already 
acting on the CLT model, prompting the city to apply for a $1.65 million grant through 
Enterprise Community Partners’ Community Land Trust Initiative in partnership with the New 
York Attorney General’s office (Savitch-Lew, 2018). The grant was received in the summer of 
2017 and has since been distributed to various organizations engaged in CLT work, particularly 
for organization and education efforts. A core use of these funds has been a CLT workshop 
series conducted by NYCCLI with 12 CLT organizations all at different stages of development. 
In December, the City Council voted to officially recognize CLTs, codifying the model 
with the intent of entering into regulatory agreements with them the way the city would with 
other legally acknowledged non-profits (Savitch-Lew, 2017b). The Community Land Trust 
Initiative continues to expand, with an additional $8 million dedicated to CLT development 
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across the state by the Attorney General’s office in February of 2019 (NY Attorney General 
Website). In June 2019, the City Council designated $750,000 in its budget toward incubating 
CLTs across the city (Spivack, 2019). The funds, distributed through NYCCLI, are aimed at the 
crucial education and organizing needed in this period to garner greater community inclusion, 
organizational capacity, and political support. 
Such support from the Attorney General, Enterprise, and the city has allowed for great 
strides in the expansion of the movement’s early stages of pre-development work. Through the 
work of NYCCLI as well as the New Economy Project, large and small CLTs have been able to 
develop and legitimize themselves, though funding has primarily gone to better established CLTs 
such as Interboro, Cooper Square, and the East Harlem El Barrio Community Land Trust 
(EHEBCLT). The relationship between the city and these organizations is still yet to be 
solidified, particularly for smaller fledgling groups. Yet outspoken support from the Mayor as 
well as the City Council demonstrates that the movement is growing, and searching for the full 
city investment that is arguably necessary if the movement is to continue (Rivera & Richards, 
2019). While the exact number of CLTs in the city continues to grow, there are at least 12 
established trusts who participated in the NYCCLI workshop, while the organization boasts 20 
member organizations on its website. 
 
Locations of known CLTs 
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Most recently, as part of Mayor de Blasio’s State of the City on February 6 2020, he 
recognized community land trusts as a model particularly “promising” in preserving community 
control of land in the face of the increasing privatization of affordable housing. “Can we find 
ways to keep affordable housing in the hands of the people?” he asks (Transcript, 2020). He 
follows this question with the announcement that the city will officially incorporate CLTs into its 
affordable housing strategy, starting with 3,000 families and theoretically growing to tens of 
thousands. While this is a vague statement, it illustrates the city’s growing recognition and 
adoption of the model. It is unclear how the city and agencies like HPD plan to move forward 
with this promise, but it is not the first time New York has used shared-equity and community 
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NEW YORK CITY’S RELEVANT PROGRAMS 
 
New York City is dominated by a competitive and increasingly unaffordable housing 
market. In addition to its sizable share of public housing, the city employs several top-down 
financial incentives to encourage the private market to build and preserve affordable housing. As 
this is the city’s main strategy to impact the affordability crisis, tax abatements and public 
subsidies mostly replace opportunities for stable affordable housing provided in perpetuity under 
the control of either the city or its residents. However, such community-based models do exist 
and in numbers. The following is an analysis of existing or recently terminated programs 
promoting some form of shared-equity or community control. Each program serves as a vital tool 
in the figurative affordable housing toolkit of the city, some more experimental than others, all 
providing uniquely empowering opportunities for those not otherwise adequately served by the 
city’s mainstream affordability strategy. 
Many of the city’s programs for addressing tenant and community control of housing 
were born out of the city’s gradual abandonment through the middle of the 20th century through 
the 1980s. These programs were first implemented in the peak of New York City’s as a reaction, 
when the city was forced to take control of swaths of distressed, foreclosed, and abandoned 
properties with no mechanisms to redistribute them (Leavitt & Saegert, 1988). In 1976, the city 
passed Local Law 45, allowing its agencies to seize private properties ​in rem​ after only one year 
of tax delinquency. This measure was enacted to curb the rate of unpaid property taxes through 
the threat of disownership, but instead lead to an unexpected mass public seizure of property. 
The city’s ownership of occupied housing peaked in 1986 at 53,000 buildings, a number that was 
slowly alleviated through its redistribution programs back to tenants, communities, and capable 
landlords (Saegert & Winkel, 1998). 
 
Housing Development Fund Corporations 
The Housing Development Fund Corporation (HDFC) cooperative program is the city’s 
largest mechanism supporting collective ownership, covering tens of thousands of units across 
the five boroughs. Technically, an HDFC is a residential cooperative that receives reduced real 
Allerton | 34 
 
estate taxes in exchange for limitations on the equity built within the cooperative. For example, 
restrictions are put on the resale amount for a unit, and income restrictions are put on those in 
order to enter an HDFC. Incorporated under Article XI of the New York Private Housing 
Finance Law, members of an HDFC cooperative cannot have an income greater than 165 percent 
of AMI. The HDFC model was first implemented as a way for the city to transfer properties back 
to private ownership without displacing residents, something organizations like the Urban 
Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB) advocated for. Groups like UHAB were able to garner 
support for the transfer of hundreds of derelict low-income buildings into collective, 
owner-occupied, self-sufficient housing. 
The HDFC model has had mixed results. Many reports illustrate how the model can be 
financially unsustainable, with low-income residents unable to pay what taxes they do have to 
pay as well as utilities and major building repairs. With such financial burdens accruing for many 
HDFCs across the city, foreclosure rates on these buildings have continued, with hundreds more 
targeted by the city with the potential of transfer back to a landlord-rental model (Zimmer, 2015; 
Stewart, 2018; Swarts, 2019; Gartland, 2019). In 2015 the city took action against 111 
cooperatives, while in 2018 there were roughly 60 cooperatives on a city foreclosure list 
(Stewart, 2018). Similar with CLTs, there is little research focused on how and why these 
cooperatives continue to fall into dismay and foreclosure. Rather, every year the stock gets 
reduced with little action to revive this once powerful and popular mechanism. Yet many other 
cooperatives have succeeded in making payments and keeping their apartments affordable and 
thriving (Sidransky, 2019). The model has arguably been successful in maintaining affordability, 
creating opportunities for community control, and preserving buildings that were being failed by 
the traditional private market. 
Theoretically, and what has taken place at Cooper Square Committee, is when a CLT is 
formed, the buildings are converted into cooperatives, with both organizations supporting one 
another financially and organizationally. Tenants own the buildings, and sit on the board of the 
land trust in a single ecosystem of shared, affordable property. But this model has only been 
successful in the instance of Cooper Square, while many others are continuing to fight for it with 
little success thus far. 
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Tenant Interim Lease Program 
Many of the HDFCs that exist today were created through the Tenant Interim Lease 
program (TIL). TIL was first established in 1978 among the same crises of foreclosure and 
abandonment that led to the widespread use of HDFC cooperatives to save such buildings. 
Enforced by HPD’s Division of Alternative Management (DAMP), the program provides a 
secure pipeline for tenants of city-owned buildings to organize and educate themselves in 
preparation for collective ownership, while rents are restructured into maintenance fees to pay 
for building upkeep. Once required educational courses and the property is deemed financially 
stable, ownership of units is transferred to tenants at $250 per unit. Initially, rehabilitation of the 
building was also included in the program through HPD funding, yet this has changed since the 
incorporation of the Affordable Neighborhood Cooperative Program, discussed later. 
The establishment of the TIL program certainly marked a period of social idealism in the 
city’s history, one that was perhaps necessitated by the fiscal and housing crises of the time: 
“TIL rested on the premise that with HPD and its surrogates in the non-profit housing 
community providing managerial and material support… TIL tenants would acquire the tools to 
determine their own future…” (Siegel Teitelbaum & Evans, 2017). Yet as has been the case with 
HDFC cooperative more broadly, there have been several critiques of the TIL program. Aside 
from those targeting the general HDFC model as being unsustainable, some argue that the TIL 
program is insufficient in training tenants to effectively operate a building on their own (Swarts, 
2019). It is also apparent that many HDFCs coming out of TIL have been unable to afford rising 
maintenance costs and major repairs at their low income levels.  
Yet there are several issues thought to be inherent to the program that have left many 
buildings and their tenants stuck in the program with a promised ownership transfer nowhere in 
sight. These include that preexisting rents were not even enough to cover rising maintenance 
costs, therefore reduced fees would certainly not be enough; subsidies and tax abatements by 
HPD were insufficient, lacking the foresight to fully cover the gap between collected fees and 
maintenance costs; and major capital repairs required for buildings in such poor condition were 
not factored into the financial model of the program (Siegel Teitelbaum & Evans, 2017). Such 
core issues have led to mass evictions of TIL residents and buildings stuck in the program for 
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years (Clark, 2017). Because of these miscalculations on the part of the city, many TIL and 
HDFC buildings have been forced back into foreclosure and turned over to private developers. 
 
Community Management Program 
Also within the jurisdiction of DAMP was the Community Management Program (CMP), 
a tool similar to TIL. In response to the city’s widespread ownership of abandoned and 
foreclosed properties, HPD not only looked to tenants as potential property owners, but locally 
based non-profits as well. These “community management groups” were designated as 
responsible and experienced organizations capable of taking ownership of city-owned properties 
through a Request for Qualifications issued every three years. The city would use the same 
federally-sourced funds to initially rehabilitate these properties as with TIL, requiring that 
properties within CMP were kept affordable, tenant associations were established, and repairs 
were done when necessary. CMP, first established in 1979, transferred several thousand units to 
community control before being discontinued in 1994. 
Such community ownership, while short-lived, proved to be successful in building social 
cohesion and applying social capital to the success of a collectively-owned property, further 
demonstrating the ability of tenants and community organizations to bear the burden of 
successfully operating their own homes collectively, despite the economic boundaries 
disproportionately impacting those involved in these programs (Leavitt & Saegert, 1988). 
 
Affordable Neighborhood Cooperative Program 
Through the TIL program the city established an estimated 950 cooperatives covering 
17,000 units through early 2019 (Herzenberg, 2019). However, the model of rehabilitating each 
building entirely through HPD funds proved to be unsustainable. The rehab, essential to the TIL 
process for such dilapidated buildings, has been turned over to private developers since 2015 
through the Affordable Neighborhood Cooperative Program (ANCP). Through ANCP, 
developers selected by HPD are tasked with rehabilitating properties still in the TIL program, a 
process funded through loans of up to $200,000 per unit as well as other sources. The TIL 
program theoretically stays intact during this time, with ownership transferred over to tenants 
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once rehabilitation and training are completed. So far ANCP has been applied to under a 
thousand TIL units. 
While ANCP allows rehabilitation projects to be more financially feasible for HPD, 
several concerns have arisen since the beginning of the program. As with TIL, some tenants have 
waited over a decade while their units remain untouched by HPD or a private developer 
(Herzenberg, 2019). Delays and alleged corruption led to a 38 percent vacancy rate of 
TIL/ANCP units in 2017 (Nonko, 2017), while others fear that the involvement of private 
developers will threaten the tenant control promised by the city through the programs (Clark, 
2017). It is also alleged that the loans borrowed by the city to fund rehabs are expected to be paid 
by residents through increased rents and higher buy-back options (Mena, 2019; Herzenberg, 
2019). 
 
Multifamily Disposition and Finance Programs 
Another method the city has used to rehabilitate and transfer property back into the 
private market is through its Multifamily Disposition and Finance Programs, comprising the 
Third Party Transfer Program (TPT) and the Multifamily Preservation Loan Program (MPLP). 
Through the programs, HPD and the Department of Finance identify distressed properties behind 
on their taxes, and if they institute a foreclosure, the property is immediately transferred to a 
non-profit organization while rehabilitation is undertaken by a private developer. According to 
the city, all TPT properties are owned by Neighborhood Restore, a citywide HDFC organization 
first founded in 1999, while all MPLP properties are still owned by the city. The program 
provides low-interest loans through HPD with additional funding sources, a structure similar to 
ANCP. The programs have in many ways replaced CMP, transferring foreclosed properties to 
non-profit ownership rather than tenant control. The major difference, cited as well between TIL 
and ANCP, is funding taking the form of low-interest loans going to private entities rather than 
direct HPD rehab. These programs are also still utilized at a small scale, having been applied to 
under a thousand units thus far. 
While the goals of the programs are to preserve affordable housing through partnership 
with non-profit organizations, however it has not always been this clear. Recent actions by the 
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city seek to use TPT against struggling HDFCs or buildings stuck in TIL, targeting 
tax-delinquent tenants for dispossession (Swarts, 2019). Such hostile use of the program against 
its tenant-based counterparts seems highly counterintuitive, working against the initial goals of 




The city offers several other programs targeting abandoned or tax-delinquent properties 
through assessment and potential transfer of ownership. The 7A Management Program, 
established in 1965, appoints non-profit or for-profit housing organizations to immediately 
manage properties that have been abandoned by their landlords. The organization serves as an 
administrator rather than an owner, collecting rents and servicing the building and tenants during 
an interim while the city decides how to proceed. The Zombie Homes Initiative seeks to locate 
and assess smaller abandoned properties across the city. This initiative, started in 2017, 
prioritizes data collection around these properties, with a pipeline for transfer and rehab not fully 
solidified in the program. The development of new affordable cooperatives has also been a 
recent project of the city, implementing the Affordable Cooperative Housing Program from 2004 
to 2007, and the Open Door program beginning in 2018. 
What these additional programs illustrate is both a supply of city-owned properties fueled 
through tax foreclosure or abandonment, as well as a demand for more affordable, 
collectively-owned housing in New York City. 
 
Findings 
There are several important points to glean from these programs. One already mentioned 
is the notion of a supply of city-owned properties ready for rehabilitation and transfer to third 
party owners, or properties stuck somewhere in the process, and a demand for these types of 
collective ownership structures. Beginning in the 1970s, the city in a short period of time owned 
tens of thousands of new properties. As the city does not operate as a permanent property 
manager, it has since sought to relinquish itself of these properties through equitable and 
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financially stable means. These properties continue to exist and crop up across the city, 
necessitating these types of programs. 
Another point is the city’s sheer capacity to maintain these third party ownership 
structures. Programs like TIL and CMP illustrate the city’s ability to not just hand property over 
to tenants and community organizations, but to support them through the process with adequate 
funding and training. Much of the “failure” that is attributed to these programs is due to 
mismanagement, corruption, and reductions in funding from the federal level. Such reductions 
have led to the establishment of programs like ANCP, TPT, and MPLP, yet the initiative to 
acknowledge and levy the third party owner, whether that be tenants or larger communities, is 
very much still alive. 
Finally, it is important to note that these programs were all born out of a crisis, 
specifically in abandonment and private disinvestment. The city was arguably forced to find 
ownership models that deviated from the normal private developer and landlord. In the 1970s 
and 80s there was a dearth of private investment necessitating a rethinking of the housing 
system. In that sense it is difficult to push for the same agenda in a time where private demand 
and investment has perhaps never been higher. Yet we are very much in a crisis of affordability, 
one that demands new innovative approaches to housing and homeownership that the city 
certainly has the capacity to answer. We do not need to wait for that period of abandonment to 
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RESEARCH and FINDINGS 
 
Cooper Square Community Land Trust 
As mentioned previously, Cooper Square Community Land Trust (CSCLT) in 
partnership with Cooper Square Mutual Housing Association (CSMHA) is by far the most 
established and successful CLT in New York City. With a decades long history and a strong 
portfolio of tenant cooperatives on collectively owned land, CSCLT is an exemplary model for 
CLTs looking to break the barriers of a high-demand city. However, they do not host their own 
share of challenges when it comes to negotiating with the city, expanding their reach, and 
advocating for greater community control and affordability across the five boroughs. 
Valerio Orselli has worked with Cooper Square Committee since the 1970s, leaving for a 
brief hiatus to work with the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, but 
working as director of CSCLT for the last 20 years. Much of Valerio’s earlier work with Cooper 
Square involved pressuring various city administrations to provide more affordability through its 
infamous urban renewal projects. One “deal with the devil” happened during the Koch mayoral 
period, where Cooper Square was able to convince the city to preserve the affordability of a 
quarter of units being developed on vacant sites along Houston Street, while additionally 
renovating a host of buildings in the area at no cost to tenants. Cooper Square was also 
advocating for programs like TIL at the time, yet soon discovered the financial flaws in the 
program mentioned previously. Because of incurring costs of renovation to buildings with no 
funding sources after HPD’s initial investment, Cooper Square decided to create CSMHA and 
CSCLT as a more organized, efficient, accountable management structure. 
Within cooperative buildings across the Lower East Side, taxes were not being paid, 
apartments were being sold under the table, and other issues were contributing to a flawed 
system that forced many TIL/HDFC buildings into foreclosure. CSMHA was created to centrally 
manage these cooperatives, while CSCLT would essentially manage the MHA through a 
cogovernance role, giving guidance and ensuring the Cooper Square’s goals of affordability and 
community control were being met. As a steward of the land on which the CSMHA buildings 
sat, CSCLT leased the property to the MHA through strict terms, ensuring fiduciary 
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responsibilities were being fulfilled and chances of speculation were minimized. In addition to 
the ground lease, the CLT had and continues to occupy five representatives on the MHA’s 15 
person board. With pooled resources and extra supervision and support, the 21 cooperatives 
managed by Cooper Square have thrived. 
The CLT’s first 10 properties were acquired in 1996, a number that has grown to 21 
since, and continues to expand as two more HDFCs have opted into the Cooper Square CLT 
model. CSCLT has been able to acquire land through strong community organizing around the 
city’s urban renewal properties rooted in a strong track record with the city. Fortunately, the 
organization has not had to compete through traditional RFP processes for the properties it owns, 
but as Valerio explains, “When it comes to additional properties, that’s a guessing game.” 
Troubled HDFCs, one of CSCLT’s major targets for expansion, are traditionally adopted and 
redistributed by the city through the TPT program where third party organizations apply for 
ownership. CSCLT has been able to rely on its history, experience, and relationship with HPD to 
compete for properties, but nothing is guaranteed. Funding streams differ per property as well, 
and can determine how a building is financially structured. All of CSCLT’s buildings are 
currently cooperatives, but if they want to tap into the LIHTC market for example, that requires 
units be rental only. 
In terms of challenges faced by the movement, Valerio recognizes that not every budding 
CLT has an established relationship with HPD allowing them to take over property outside of 
competitive RFP or TPT processes. That transfer cycle, where HPD prioritizes CLTs with 
experience or partnerships with experienced actors, creates a barrier for new, grassroots CLTs in 
acquiring property. Interboro CLT is a city-wide organization that, while it is new, is backed by 
large, established non-profits like UHAB and Habitat for Humanity. The East Harlem/El Barrio 
Community Land Trust (EHEBCLT) is also in its beginning phase, yet has partners in Cooper 
Square and Banana Kelly, a longtime housing non-profit based in the Bronx. Because of these 
connections, these three CLTs have received the most funding from the Enterprise/Attorney 
General Community Land Trust Initiative, and arguably have the greatest relationships with the 
city so far. 
Allerton | 42 
 
When considering the city’s role, Valerio speaks of a small program in DAMP designed 
to support MHAs specifically, something that helped CSMHA get off the ground. He also 
mentions ANCP which, while it has been critiqued for relying on the private sector, is much 
stricter, more transparent, and more efficient than TIL, a “TIL on steroids.” What Valerio has 
been advocating for is a DAMP program that is geared toward CLTs only, one that takes the 
TIL/ANCP model and expands it past one building at a time. The reason CSMHA/CSCLT is so 
successful is that it is able to pool resources, to break past the financial barriers of the individual 
cooperative. Valerio thinks the city needs to support this kind of structure, and with funding 
sources that are forgivable or permanent. He makes the point, “You cannot provide affordable 
housing for families at 30 percent AMI if you have to pay loans back.” If rent is for maintenance 
only, as is the case for an HDFC, there is no budget for loans the way that ANCP is structured. 
The city must truly invest in these projects through funding not tied to the cash flow of tenants. 
When looking to the future, Valerio hopes the city will better support CLTs in the city 
through some sort of DAMP program, perhaps. He also sees the movement calling for a 
paradigm shift in how we think about housing, and what we prioritize. In late 2019, Valerio 
stepped down as director of CSCLT, looking to help advocate for the shared-equity model in 
other ways. He remains on the board of EHEBCLT. 
 
Mott Haven-Port Morris Community Land Stewards 
South Bronx Unite, a community based organization made up of residents dedicated to 
improving the social, economic, and environmental wellbeing of the Mott Haven and Port Morris 
neighborhoods. One of SBU’s major projects is its CLT, the Mott Haven-Port Morris 
Community Land Stewards (MHPMCLS), aimed at addressing some of the issues of community 
and environmental health and wellbeing through stewardship and ownership of land. 
Mychal Johnson is an organizing member of SBU and MHPMCLS, and is able to shed 
light on the issues at hand primarily being concerned with the city’s and state’s use of land. The 
industrialization of the waterfront, for example, was an intentional decision, a 99 year lease of 
property owned by the State Department of Transportation. The waterfront includes uses such as 
water transfer stations, power plants, and diesel-intensive businesses contributing considerable 
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pollution to the area. The South Bronx neighborhoods are also overlaid with a dense system of 
highways not only disrupting the physical environment and social fabrics of the area, but adding 
significantly to local air contamination. This lack of access to clean air or the potential 
recreational uses of the waterfront have led to some of the highest rates of asthma, obesity, and 
diabetes in the city, making the Bronx the most unhealthy county in the state. Cognitive 
development issues have also been linked to air quality in the area, making the school district 
one of the worst performing in the city. These are all consequences of the ways in which the city 
has chosen to develop the area over decades, says Mychal, boiling down to the city’s and 
industrial corporations strategic use of land. These are issues that SBU aims to confront through 
initiatives to expand local recreational opportunities, open access to the waterfront for local 
residents, and impose flood mitigation efforts which the city has not implemented despite the 
fact that much of the area lies within a 100-year floodplain. 
SBU is also looking at real estate speculation happening across the South Bronx more 
recently, where units are being developed for those earning seven times the local median income. 
This, in addition to mitigating the environmental, social, and economic issues of Mott Haven and 
Port Morris, is where a CLT can serve the community. The model to Mychal and MHPMCLS is 
a means of both pushing back against real estate speculation and promoting community health 
and culture by putting the land in the hands of residents. For them, this is not just a model for 
housing, but for a variety of uses tailored to the most pressing needs of the neighborhood. 
MHPMCLS has been conducting asset mapping to see what vacant lots and vacant buildings are 
available in the area. After understanding which assets are potential sites for stewardship or 
ownership, they hosted visioning sessions to understand from community members what they 
would like to see happen on these lots and in these buildings. What they learned was that 
residents do not see housing as the first priority, rather communal uses like green spaces and 
community centers as a first strategy of the CLT. 
On Mychal’s block sits a city-owned residential building that has been vacant since 2011. 
Before then it was used as an acupuncture clinic designed for meth recovery, set up by the 
Young Lords. Mychal remembers the clinic, and the good it brought to the community. Based on 
this history and the feedback received in the visioning sessions, MHPMCLS has proposed a 
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community center in the building focusing on three pillars of community wellbeing: health, 
education, and the arts. It would be called the H.E.ART Center, and would take a holistic 
approach to the host of issues facing the community, serving multiple purposes beyond the need 
for housing. They have also been able to inspect and evaluate the space with a permit from the 
city, collaborating with different professionals to complete a feasibility study of their idea. 
MHPMCLS has spoken with the Mayor’s office about their idea, and has received support from 
Comptroller Scott Stringer as well as local councilmembers. They are now pushing the city to 
put out an RFP geared toward their idea which they would then apply for. Mychal says that they 
have been told the city would not just give them the property through a single-source transfer, a 
process that the city does regularly engage through TPT or case-by-case bases such as with 
Cooper Square. The reasoning behind the city’s decision not to give SBU the property is unclear, 
but the lack of an established relationship between SBU with the city, or their lack of a track 
record when it comes to managing property, most likely influences such a decision. The city 
certainly has the authority to give this property to the CLT for a dollar, as is common practice 
with for-profit developers, yet is choosing not to. 
MHPMCLS is also looking to steward green spaces like community gardens and public 
spaces like along highways, not only beautifying the areas but combatting environmental threats 
by creating permeable surfaces and planting trees to capture carbon emissions. The CLT is 
currently stewarding some green space, while working to install solar panels in several 
community gardens. While there is certainly a need for affordable housing across the city, what 
the communities of Mott Haven and Port Morris find most pressing are community facilities and 
open green spaces, both of which SBU continue to fight for through their CLT. Mychal sees that 
as a unique capacity of the CLT model, to gear its uses to the exact needs of the community 
rather than fit a strict model imposed by a top-down program or service from the same city that 
has disinvested in the community health of the South Bronx for decades. 
This is a reason why Mychal is hesitant when it comes to city involvement in the CLT 
movement. The very purpose of the CLT model is to ensure that decisions are coming from the 
grassroots rather than a top-down planning process so familiar in the Bronx. “THe most 
important element of a community land trust is the community,” says Mychal. “The city’s 
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helpful, but they’re not fundamental in the success or the potential growth of a community land 
trust.” If they are to successfully implement the CLT model, it would certainly not come from a 
city program or initiative. Mychal is open to city support, and sees that they can serve a purpose, 
but only in facilitating the community-led efforts of the CLT. When asked about a city program, 
Mychal does hope that the city would potentially prioritize CLTs in certain RFP processes, as the 
acquisition of land is a step the city can certainly help in, especially when considering 
city-owned properties. 
When it comes to major challenges, aside from acquiring the H.E.ART Center property, 
MHPMCLS is most concerned with organizing and education at the moment. This is the phase 
they are in, fighting for political support and building a coalition of residents passionate about 
their community. The difference between a CLT and an organization like a Community 
Development Corporation, according to Mychal, is whether or not the community is empowered, 
whether the community is supposedly being represented or is taking the action themselves. 
Another challenge is competition from real estate speculators, especially as developers continue 
to buy up property in the South Bronx. Mychal says this is the kind of development activity that 
the city is comfortable with and is more likely to support at the moment. Funding is also a 
challenge, but the $60,000 received from the City Council through NYCCLI has certainly fueled 
the organizing efforts and capacity building that MHPMCLS has been able to conduct so far. 
Regarding the future, Mychal is looking to continue the fight for the H.E.ART Center, 
and to continue community organizing and coalition building. “That work never ends.” 
 
Northern Manhattan Community Land Trust 
The Northern Manhattan Community Land Trust (NMCLT) was born in tandem with the 
fight against the city’s plan to rezone Inwood, Manhattan’s northernmost and last affordable 
neighborhood (Haag, 2019). The group formed from members of Northern Manhattan is Not for 
Sale (NMN4S), the organization that put together the Uptown United Platform, a community-led 
alternative plan to the rezoning. These members first came together to respond to a Request for 
Expression of Interest (RFEI) put out by HPD in January of 2017. The RFEI was specifically for 
groups interested in forming or in the early processes of forming CLTs across the city, surveying 
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public interest in the model as well as potential sites and partner organizations. When the $1.65 
million came to the city from the Attorney General and Community Enterprise Partners, some of 
it was dispersed to Cooper Square, EHEBCLT, and Interboro, while the rest was invested into a 
learning exchange led by NYCCLI. Respondents to the RFEI, 12 in total, were brought into the 
exchange, a monthly workshop lasting from 2017 through mid-2019. The workshops consisted 
of organizing lessons from NYCCLI, knowledge exchanges between participating CLTs, and 
teachings from well-established CLTs across the country like the Champlain Housing Trust and 
Dudley Street. 
Paul Epstein, a member of NMCLT since 2017, describes the exchange as a remarkable 
experience and the foundation of the work they have been able to accomplish. Such an exchange 
is pivotal in the collective organizing of CLTs across the city, particularly between those more 
established like Cooper Square and those burgeoning CLTs like in Northern Manhattan. Paul in 
fact looks to Cooper Square as a model, as proof that CLTs can work in a city like New York. 
While NMCLT is still in the process of incorporation and has yet to own any property, they are 
interested in potentially following the CLT/MHA approach of Cooper Square. Paul recognizes 
that the MHA model only makes sense at scale, but as a member of a cooperative himself, sees 
the difficulties in balancing maintenance costs and reserve funds even in a market-rate 
cooperative. Pooling money is essential in these collective ownership models, where a boiler 
replacement can mean the financial death of an HDFC. 
When working with the city, NMCLT has been frustrated, particularly in the 
incorporation process. According to Paul, HPD is requiring that their organization incorporate 
twice, as both a non-profit and an HDFC. The reasoning behind this is that HDFC incorporation 
allows for certain city subsidies that a regular non-profit would not have access to. However, this 
greatly restricts land uses available to NMCLT to housing with some ancillary non-housing uses 
like a rear yard or commercial tenant on the first floor. The issue here is that Paul and NMCLT 
are not necessarily looking to develop or preserve housing themselves, but to simply own the 
land and decide who is able to manage what is built. NMCLT is not looking for development or 
preservation subsidies from the city, leaving no reason to incorporate as an HDFC. Their plan, as 
Valerio cited as the path forward for small CLTs, is to partner with an established CDC or other 
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non-profit developer such as Northern Manhattan Improvement Corporation (NMIC), an 
organization with which they have already begun to build a relationship. However, Paul says that 
when they spoke with HPD, they still required all co-signers of the regulatory agreement 
attached to any city subsidy, tax break, or land transfer to be HDFCs, meaning both the CLT and 
the non-profit partner. 
Incorporation has been a major challenge for NMCLT. While most CLTs in the city are 
attached to some kind of established parent organization, NMCLT sees itself as a truly grassroots 
coalition among concerned residents, yet this comes with its own set of challenges. They have 
drafted bylaws of how a parent organization structure could work, with an identical board for 
both the umbrella CLT and each individual HDFC on CLT-owned land, yet this model is far 
from where they are now. Right now they are looking at a TIL building on 191st Street, whose 
tenants are interested in adopting the CLT model once they leave the program and incorporate as 
an HDFC themselves. They are also expecting $5,000 from the City Council CLT budget to 
trickle down to them to use at their discretion, but have yet to receive it. 
They also recognize the issue of accurately representing their community. Right now 
NMCLT is a small group of people attempting to stand for a largely divided and rapidly 
changing community. There are stark racial and economic discrepancies in Inwood, and even 
without the rezoning, new residents are moving in and changing the neighborhood’s social fabric 
and built environment. In their bylaws, Paul says they made the point to require that more than 
half of the board has to either live or work in the area served by the CLT, yet gentrification can 
mean those residents could be younger, wealthier, and whiter than most of Inwood and 
Washington Heights currently is. “We need organizations with much deeper roots” to partner 
with, says Paul, in order to realize the community aspect of the CLT. Yet finding the right 
partner can be difficult. An organization that shares their vision can be hard to come by or simply 
not exist. If they do find a housing developer, a lot of power would be ceded to that organization, 
one that is not necessarily rooted in the community and is certainly not directed by community 
members or residents of their projects. Yet NMCLT does not have the leverage to avoid a 
partner, especially when facing the city. 
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Another challenge is the cost of land. Unless property is given to them by the city, they 
have no capacity to compete for property in the market. They are currently seeking grants and 
other private funding sources, and while their fundraising efforts have proven relatively 
successful, it is not near the kind of capital required to make an imprint in New York City’s 
housing market. Similarly to the advice of Valerio, Paul knows that the first few properties will 
be the hardest to acquire. He is certainly interested in the idea of a prioritization of CLTs in some 
RFP or TPT processes, as it may be the only way they can hope to acquire the land so pivotal in 
this model. Yet Paul calls this administration “ambivalent” to CLTs, and does not see such a 
program or any aggressive effort from the city happening soon. 
 
Western Queens Community Land Trust 
The Western Queens Community Land Trust (WQCLT) was first envisioned not as a 
residential land trust but as a means for supporting small scale manufacturing, artists, and local 
commercial activity. When it was announced that Amazon would be setting up a headquarters in 
Long Island City, there was widespread resistance to the deal, one involving billions of dollars in 
tax breaks and subsidies from the city and state. Members of the local community organized not 
only from anger with the city for the financial package, but from fear of being displaced by the 
sheer presence of Amazon. Residential and commercial rents would surely rise, pushing out 
countless residents and small businesses and permanently disrupting the existing community in 
the name of economic development. 
WQCLT was started among a group of those small manufacturers, artists, and others 
feeling their livelihoods threatened by the Amazon deal, and who wanted to propose an 
alternative. Scott Larson, a faculty member at Queens College and academic advisor to WQCLT, 
says that the founding members realized, “We can’t just be against something, we need to be for 
something, and that something is community control of these spaces.” What they saw as a 
solution to the threat of Amazon was community ownership of land, straightforward community 
control to prevent land uses like this that would undoubtedly do the neighborhood more harm 
than any good projected by the city. As members of the Amazon deal resistance, they wanted 
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nothing like a Community Benefits Agreement or any kind of negotiation, but the power to 
implement their own visions for their community, whatever that might look like. 
In the beginning, focus was around the building owned by the Department of Education 
and made a part of the Amazon deal. A space of more than 600,000 square feet, the massive 
building had been unused for years, but as a city-owned building, WQCLT believed it served an 
important purpose. “Public resources, public assets, which a city-owned building or space is, 
should never be sold to developers for profit” no matter the use or financial return, says Scott. 
Similar to the thoughts of MHPMCLS, as public assets indebted to the direct benefit of the 
community, city-owned properties are the focus of WQCLT. Since Amazon dropped out, 
WQCLT has continued to fight for community control of the DOE building. Before Amazon, the 
luxury housing developer TF Cornerstone had a deal with the city to develop the property, and 
both the developer and the city seem to have returned to the original plan. Scott and WQCLT do 
not see the city, particularly the Department of City Planning or the Economic Development 
Corporation, as an ally in their fight. Instead of pleading with the city to change their mind, they 
find better conversations to be had with local elected officials like local Councilmember Jimmy 
Van Bramer. Councilmembers have a lot of say when it comes to land use, and Van Bramer has 
supported the ideas of WQCLT to an extent, yet greater coalition building and political pressure 
is required for any kind of endorsement or action on his part. 
In terms of uses for the building, WQCLT does not have a full plan. Different members 
have proposed a host of uses that such a large space could easily share, such as a rooftop garden, 
a kitchen incubator, and even a school, as well as job training and small manufacturing uses. Yet 
the main objective is to have community control of the property, then decide what to do with it. 
WQCLT wants to make sure everyone in the area has a say in what the building would contain, 
including residents from the local Queensbridge Houses, as public housing residents are often 
overlooked in the community-planning process. 
Since the Amazon fight, the CLT has partnered with Woodside on the Move, a 
community organization more concerned with housing and affordability. In this collaboration, 
they have started looking at potential sites for residential development in Woodside and other 
Western Queens neighborhoods. They have analyzed city data to identify city-owned 
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decommissioned or sold off properties in what they consider their catchment area, Long Island 
City to Flushing. They have recently started to look at a garage owned by the Department of 
Sanitation nestled inside the Ravenswood Houses in Astoria. The garage is being 
decommissioned, and sits adjacent to a park parcel. The site is zoned R5, meaning housing could 
easily be developed, but the priority of the CLT is to give control of the parcels to the 
Ravenswood residents. Scott strongly emphasizes that a specific use of land was never the 
founding motivation for the CLT. Community control is what matters: if the community can 
control the land, then they can decide what goes on top later. 
As of February 2020, WQCLT is on the cusp of incorporating as a non-profit. So far they 
have not been required by HPD to incorporate as an HDFC as well, as is the case with NMCLT, 
but then again they have not been working with the city in any capacity. With their incorporation 
comes a host of questions and concerns, most pressing of which is how community 
representation will truly play out, how a non-profit can not only represent a community as large 
as Western Queens, but actually ​be ​that community. Scott mentions the endless nights devising a 
governing structure to best accomplish that goal, the very meaning of the CLT’s existence. Work 
toward this has mostly taken the form outreach to every corner of the catchment area, inviting 
stakeholders to involve themselves in their work. The current steering committee consists of 
community members as well as advisors like Scott who are not local residents. While the 
traditional three-party CLT board includes professionals who do not necessarily live in the area, 
Scott says that people like him who are involved at this stage will never serve on the executive 
board once the CLT is officially in operation. 
Scott says their biggest challenge right now is acquiring property. As they are primarily 
targeting city-owned property, it is a matter of convincing HPD, DOE, or DOS that community 
control is a valuable investment. There is a lot of demand for any vacant or underutilized parcel, 
and WQCLT certainly does not have the capacity to compete financially with large for-profit 
developers. However, that first property acquisition is a significant win, one that can establish 
the credibility of the CLT and prove the viability of the model. This challenge, to Scott, is the 
only way that WQCLT hopes the city will support them. Otherwise, further intervention can pose 
as antithetical to the purposes of the model. Scott sees the way the city is moving with CLTs as 
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an effort to fold the model into their strategies of addressing the affordable housing issue, 
something WQCLT does not necessarily envision for itself. For the city, “this is just about 
economic development… housing as economic development, planning as economic 
development, rezoning as economic development… But who for? The people who live there 
now? No… It’s building a city for some intended population.” This process of traditional 
economic development as one of the city’s core roles is somehow sold as inherent to planning, as 
the way it has to be. WQCLT sees their role as not only fighting for control of public properties 
in their community but combatting that ideology more broadly. 
They can see the acquisition starting with a change in the RFP process. This means a 
rethinking of what the city is looking for. If it’s looking for the greatest financial return on its 
investment in a parcel of land, then Amazon sounds a lot better than a CLT. If the city shared the 
same value as the community, seeking a different kind of social return, then the prospect of a 
CLT beats out Amazon in preserving affordability, increasing community control, and favoring 
the needs of the current community. The CLT model once again does require new funding by the 
city. If they are able to transfer property at no cost, then partners of the CLT can locate existing 
funding streams to produce what the community wants on that land. A reprioritization of value in 
the RFP process is one thing, but experimenting with a favoring of grassroots models like CLTs 
in some RFP or TPT parcels is perfectly tangible. 
For Scott and WQCLT, this model at its core calls for the decommodification of housing, 
a system that the real estate industry is founded on and from which the city government in many 
ways benefits. But it can be a model, one of many, that the city has the capacity to try. “If it 
works, it works, and then there’s no argument against it.” This returns us to the question of 
political will. Scott makes the point that in the case of Cooper Square, the city’s economic 
decline of the 1970s opened up the door to more experimental collective forms of ownership. 
Now that the city is economically sound, it is less willing to risk what property it still has outside 
of the real estate model that brought it back to life. The city will keep hold of its “cash cow” in 
the real estate industry despite the affordability crisis that continues to escalate. We can design a 
theoretical land transfer scheme that would facilitate CLT growth, but if the city or the city 
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council lack the will or the ideological framework to recognize the value in the model, then 
city-owned property is off the table. 
 
Councilwoman Carlina Rivera 
Councilwoman Carlina Rivera represents Council District 2 in Lower Manhattan, 
covering most of the Lower East Side as well as other surrounding neighborhoods. Rivera is one 
of several City Council Members who have come out in avid support of CLTs in recent years, 
sparking growing political support and pushing for the City Council budget that passed in 2019. 
Before joining the City Council in 2018, Rivera worked as a housing organizer with Good Old 
Lower East Side, or GOLES. Through this work, she was able to gain familiarity with housing 
activism in the Lower East Side, particularly with Cooper Square and their CLT/MHA model, 
whose benefits she could see by living and working in the neighborhood. When she assumed her 
role as Councilwoman, the Attorney General had dispersed the first funding dedicated to CLTs 
the past summer, driving Rivera to champion the model and to push for support from the City 
Council. 
Rivera and her office recognize the multiple benefits made available to a community like 
the Lower East Side through CLTs. Everyone has the opportunity to have a significant say in 
local land use processes, more than they would in other ownership structures, cultivating a 
stronger, more empowered community. But according to Katie Loeb, the Budget Director for the 
Council District, “It’s also a way of ensuring that private equity or even major capitalization 
doesn’t get involved in the decision making process.” It serves a dual purpose of realizing the 
land uses the community needs or desires while blocking those it deems harmful. It also serves 
as a check on residents themselves, providing community oversight that restricts individual 
desires of tenants that might harm the community overall, like selling units or properties to 
unwanted developers or at unaffordable rates. The Lower East Side specifically is “one in which 
private equity has had a very very disastrous effect on the real estate and housing markets,” says 
Katie. Yet the possibilities of landlord harassment and gentrification as we see today in the city 
and across the country are removed once a CLT model is in place. Cooper Square, for example, 
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has been able to maintain deep affordability in a neighborhood where property values are 
skyrocketing. 
Regarding challenges to the movement, Katie recognizes capital as a broad issue. The 
value of land, and the potential to capitalize on that value is traditionally what drives not only the 
real estate industry but the city in the same vein of economic development explained by Scott 
Larson of WQCLT. Katie makes the point, “When you’re purposefully making a decision to not 
make a lot of money, it’s a harder sell.” Politically, Katie sees a lot of support for the model, 
since as a public official, making money is not the goal, but rather to represent and advocate for 
constituents. THis means helping them to stay and grow in their communities, and to impact how 
their neighborhood is preserved or changed. In this light, elected officials are not opposed to the 
model, but rather confused over the technicalities of a model so different from the norm. But 
overall, Katie and her office are excited about what growth has come for the movement and its 
political support, including the Mayor. 
Right now, education and organizing are key in the movement’s political growth. That is 
what the City Council budget is meant for, a crucial part of growing a movement that requires 
widespread community support to realize its purpose. In the Lower East Side, Cooper Square has 
already demonstrated a successful result of the organizing and education work that is happening 
in the rest of the city, serving as a view of what is potentially to come in many more 
neighborhoods. Once more CLTs start incorporating and acquiring property, Katie predicts a 
domino effect of exponential growth, energy, and excitement around the model. 
City Council Members as well as agencies like HPD have made and continue to make 
strides in driving the CLT movement forward. Katie mentions that HPD is in the process of 
developing a strategy to help in the development and proliferation of CLTs in the city, but is 
unaware of the details. The City Council will continue funding the capacity building efforts of 
NYCCLI and its member organizations, hopefully helping some to acquire their first properties. 
The creation of new CLTs is exciting for the Councilwoman’s office, seeing how burgeoning 
models adapt to their local communities and needs, differ from one another in structure and 
goals, and provide accessible and effective means of self-preservation for underserved 
communities. Katie sees a bright future for CLTs insolong as they maintain their neighborhood 
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roots. If CLTs do become a larger portion of the housing landscape in New York City, it should 
be through a broad coalition of hyper-localized trusts each with their own priorities, reflecting 
the diversity of the city they are preserving. 
 
Department of Housing Preservation and Development 
Regarding city involvement in the CLT movement, the Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development is the agency designed for the task. In 1978, HPD was created to 
manage the city’s growing housing portfolio in the wake of Local Law 45, established offices 
like the aforementioned DAMP and programs like TIL and CMP. In this sense, HPD was at the 
center of the birth of the cooperative movement in New York City, continuing to manage what 
shared-equity and alternative ownership programs remain. The agency acts as a landlord, a 
voucher issuer, a service provider, a program manager, a financier, and a community organizer 
and advocate in many ways through its Office of Neighborhood Strategies. Michael Sandler is 
the Director of Neighborhood Planning at ONS, and has played a role in developing the agency’s 
and the city’s response to the growing CLT movement. 
HPD has been working with the CLT model since the 1990s with Cooper Square. HPD 
supported the model and through subsidies arguably made viable the model Cooper Square was 
proposing. The CLT initiative has since lied relatively dormant through city administration until 
recently, when interest peaked after Mayor de Blasio came into office and Housing New York 
was underway. HPD, with support from various other agencies and actors, is tasked with 
carrying out Housing New York, a bold strategy that has required a rethinking and retooling of 
how the department had previously addressed housing and specifically housing affordability. A 
key part of this process is community planning, an undertaking led by ONS where community 
stakeholders are brought into the conversation before major housing decisions like a rezoning are 
defined and executed. ONS develops neighborhood plans which go on to inform the city’s major 
land use and zoning decisions, several of which have recently included talks of incorporating 
CLTs into their vision. 
In the previously mentioned work that has been conducted so far, namely the Attorney 
General allocation of funds, HPD had a say in how that money was distributed. Through the 
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department’s RFEI in 2017, candidates for direct funding as well as the learning exchange 
conducted by NYCCLI were selected by HPD. The agency has been shepherding cooperative 
and shared-equity programs in the city for its entire existence, and while its role has changed as 
the city’s economy has recovered and housing affordability has grown into the foreground, HPD 
will be the department to follow through on de Blasio’s promise of CLT expansion. 
According to Michael, HPD shares some of the same values as the residents organizing 
CLTs in their communities. The agency sees the promise in community empowerment, in tenants 
and community members making decisions for their property, and ensuring the responsible 
behavior of building managers and MHAs. HPD has seen firsthand the flaws in the traditional 
individual HDFC model, and how a second layer of accountability, as well as a share of 
resources, can alleviate some of the financial stressors facing so many cooperatives today. Yet 
there are still a number of challenges and unknowns in the model, how it would be rolled out 
citywide, that HPD is attempting to address before it invests fully in CLTs. 
With smaller organizations like NMCLT, they still have a long way to go in terms of 
coalition and capacity building. An organization’s track record, their experience and history, are 
important factors for HPD. Michael says that the city is not willing to simply hand over property 
to those who deem themselves representative of the community and its needs, and who promise 
to fulfill those needs accordingly. Particularly as the number of city-owned properties lessen, 
HPD does not have the flexibility to take risks on community groups in the way it might have in 
the 1980s and 1990s. That is why partnerships with longstanding and credible non-profits make 
the difference in whether the city will work with a group or not. EHEBCLT is younger than 
NMCLT, and yet through their collaboration with Banana Kelly, is in the process of acquiring its 
first portfolio of properties through HPD’s assistance. 
The department is beginning to incorporate CLTs more formally in a number of different 
lending programs, including its New Infill Homeownership Opportunities Program (NIHOP). 
The program has already developed hundreds of affordable housing units on dozens of 
city-owned vacant lots, and HPD plans to experiment with the CLT model in its next phase. The 
agency continues to work with CSCLT, EHEBCLT, and Interboro on a number of projects, and 
is hoping to allow for more involvement from other CLTs who are just now incorporating. 
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Michael notes the complexity of the process, one involving multiple actors and stakeholders, 
ground leases and regulatory agreements, and extra steps that would not otherwise be taken in 
traditional land transfers or city subsidies. 
Overall, HPD is working to devise methods of better supporting CLTs. However, 
Michael notes that many groups establishing CLTs are far from the point of credibility the city 
would need to fully invest in. CLTs need a coalition with a certain amount of capacity to be an 
effective steward of land. They need to organize and educate their communities, bring as many 
stakeholders and residents into the group as possible, gain as much grassroots support as 
possible, and partner with known and experienced organizations, all before the city can 
confidently transfer property or funds. The city has its share of failed initiatives, properties that 
were reclaimed by the city through foreclosure, and programs that never took off. HPD has 
learned from these mistakes, and is taking precautions when it comes to the CLT movement.  
However, Michael understands the critical role the city plays, pointing out that where an 
organization hopes to provide below market rents or maintenance fees, city support through 
subsidy is required. Costs of construction, renovation, and repair are too high for truly affordable 
housing costs to exist in New York without the city’s help. For now, HPD will continue to 
support the expansion of the model, devising methods to realize the promises of the Mayor. 
 
Summary of Findings 
The qualitative research of this project has produced a plethora of insights into the CLT 
movement both from the perspectives of CLTs in different stages of action and city 
representatives at varying stages of support. Several important findings can be drawn and 
discussed, with implications for the future of the movement in New York, and hints as to how 
the city might move forward in its engagement with the model. 
Firstly, it is clear that many of these CLTs and the work out of which they are born is a 
form of resistance to actions taken by the city. Whether it be a rezoning, a deal with Amazon, 
urban renewal, or industrial development of residential areas, the actions and people behind each 
CLT have been fundamentally opposed to a government planning process or choice. Further, 
those impacted by that choice in each case have disproportionately been low-income people of 
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color, in the Lower East Side, the South Bronx, Inwood, or Western Queens. What this 
demonstrates is not only an unfavorable track record of the city, but a deep lack of trust in some 
of the city’s most vulnerable communities. The history of planning in the city is a mixed one 
scarred by top-down processes that have systematically disrupted and displaced target voiceless 
communities without any recourse.  
Now as communities gather to fend for themselves through devised shared-equity 
ownership models, there is little interest in government support for credible fear of cooptation 
and further disempowerment. Many groups are not seeking city support, but are instead working 
to get what they can while still maintaining control of their own actions. Most all agree a 
prioritization of CLTs in certain land transfer processes would be highly beneficial, but beyond 
that see no role for HPD in their work. These cautions are within reason, as HPD seems to put 
unnecessary restrictions on those reaching out, for example requiring NMCLT to incorporate as 
an HDFC. Ideally, however, land acquisition could come with no unneeded caveats. 
The fact is, many CLTs are not focused on housing. Community control attracts groups to 
model above all else, even affordability. Taking ownership of property, then deciding what its 
best use is for the community, seems to be the model for groups like MHPMCLS and WQCLT. 
Others, such as NMCLT, as well as EHEBCLT and Interboro, are taking a more housing-centric 
approach, one that seems to be favorable to the city as well. The Mayor’s support for the model 
in the State of the City aligned with updates on Housing New York, while HPD clearly focuses 
its resources on affordable housing. This creates a divide, where some uses might be favored by 
municipal powers and large non-profit entities, while others may be left marginalized in the 
movement. 
One thing that all parties can agree on is the importance and power of organizing. 
Education on the model, its purposes and uses in the context of individual neighborhoods, is 
crucial in the early phases of CLT creation. “If you don’t have a base, you don’t have anything,” 
says Valerio. Relationships with the city are built on experience and history, reasons to invest in 
one organization over another, a prioritization that Michael echoes at HPD. Viability comes from 
a track record, and as much as groups can refer to Cooper Square, the first few properties seem 
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near impossible to acquire alone. Partnership with a non-profit, coupled with a strong community 
































The Viability of the CLT Model 
Many findings can be gleaned from this research, and several recommendations can come 
from those findings. The conducted research has certainly reshaped the original questions 
motivating this project, and for the better. Our original question concerning the viability of land 
trusts in New York City can be expanded into deeper questions of community representation, 
political and organizational legitimacy, strategies of asset transfer and support, and what 
community control means and looks like. 
Several findings imply the clear viability of the model in New York City. First, the 
history of innovative programming by HPD has demonstrated a significant historical and present 
interest in shared-equity ownership models, and a capacity to support such initiatives at a 
city-wide scale. Programs like TIL, CMP, and ANCP both symbolize and realize New York 
City’s unique role in shepherding tenant and community owned and operated housing. While this 
role was born out of a time of remarkably ​low ​demand, these programs survive to this day. While 
some have been terminated and others have garnered controversy or have been rolled back, the 
city and particularly the de Blasio administration continue to utilize financial and legal resources 
to uphold the shared-equity alternative. The city certainly looks quite different from when HPD 
was established, with a much stronger real estate market, far greater demand, and a continuously 
shortening supply of available land or city-owned property. Yet these programs, past and present, 
can serve as feasible models for the implementation and encouragement of tenant-owned housing 
and community-owned land in today’s environment.  
Additionally, current organizing in public, nonprofit, and grassroots sectors has 
illustrated how CLTs are possible in New York. Cooper Square alone serves as an example of a 
CLT that has been successful for decades in providing affordable housing, creating community 
control, and mitigating the effects of gentrification in one of the city’s ripest markets for real 
estate speculation. The CLTs included in this research are only a handful of organizations 
committed to this movement. With support from the municipal government, and a rapidly 
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growing energy at the grassroots around community-owned land and housing, the CLT model is 
certainly attainable even in the high-demand environment of New York City. 
We can now establish that, through the city’s history of shared-equity financing, 
continued CLT support from various city agencies and the Mayor, and a growing coalition of 
organizations and residents advocating for and realizing their own land trusts, the CLT model is 
a viable option for both maintaining affordability and garnering community control of land and 
its uses in New York City. While this may be true, further questions must be interrogated 
concerning what the model can and will look like moving forward. A major theme arising in this 
research is that of legitimacy, specifically the legitimacy of “community”, the legitimacy of land 
use, and legitimacy of means of acquiring land. We can explore these themes to better 
understand how CLTs can move forward, and what the city can do to support them. 
 
“Community” 
At the very core of this research is a conceived notion of what community is, what it 
looks like and how it behaves. A community land trust derives itself from a community voice, a 
list of demands and needs from residents manifested in a single entity. Much is assumed in 
claiming the position of an entire community, in championing the grassroots as a single nonprofit 
corporation. It assumes unity in that community, equal representation and an inherent equity in 
its own actions. It nearly weaponizes the idea of solidarity to filter a title of inherent diversity, 
contention, and plurality into one cause that is certainly more narrow and superficial than what it 
claims to represent and to embody. 
Community land trusts are not alone in these assumptions. Community-based 
organizations, community development corporations, and many others use the powerful and 
persuasive moniker not only in their titles but in how they push their agendas, how they convince 
the city and other stakeholders that they know what is best. Community is treated like a 
monolith. What separates the CLT from other existing structures is meaningful but does not 
remove this manipulation. Both residents and community members make up the board or 
steering committee of the organization, a unique and relatively bold model but one that still 
dilutes the meaning of community to a set of “qualified” individuals. Not everyone will be a 
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member of the CLT, and not every member will be on the board. Simply, the CLT is ​not ​the 
community. 
CLT organizers tend to recognize this shortcoming, and the importance of 
coalition-building, an effort that does not end. WQCLT, NMCLT, and MHPMCLS are all 
focused on engaging and educating their constituents, and creating capacities not only to hold 
and manage property but to wield the title of community justly, to accurately represent the needs 
of their residents as much as a nonprofit can. This may always be insufficient, it may always 
require further engagement, further coalition building, a wider member base and an ever 
changing identity, yet that is the work necessary for a CLT to realize its own roots and 
intentions. Valerio from CSCLT says that the key to their success has been a combination of 
community organizing and community planning, unifying constituents under shared goals and 
creating a plan to realize those goals. “If you don’t have a base, you don’t have anything,” he 
says. Mychal at MHPMCLS says while they are looking to acquire and steward green and 
community spaces in the South Bronx, their main focus is and will continue to be community 
organizing and coalition building. “That work never ends.” 
Ultimately, the organizing used to strive toward community representation and 
embodiment is important but necessarily endless. A community can be boundless, is not set by 
its residents, but is greater than the sum of its parts. It is difficult to define, something to 
continuously investigate and explore. 
 
The City’s Role 
Another core question of this research is, given the viability of the model, how the city 
government should intervene in the process of CLT growth to ensure its success. There are 
various points of support possible from the city, from education and outreach, to policy and legal 
advocacy, to land acquisition,financing, and development. CLTs can benefit from a host of 
interventions from the city, particularly in a context like New York City where land is expensive, 
land uses and policies are heavily restricted and regulated, and political will can make or break 
projects especially regarding topics like affordability and community control. In the case of 
housing, Michael of HPD points out that the provision of below market units necessarily depends 
Allerton | 62 
 
on city subsidy, that costs of land, construction, and maintenance do not allow for affordable 
housing. It is for this reason that programs like those previously described exist, to bridge the gap 
between the demands and supplies of the market. This translates to non-housing uses as well, as 
certain costs, legalities, and resources are inherent to all land uses. 
The question of community legitimacy also arises from the city’s perspective. In 
supporting CLTs in any capacity, the city considers that action an investment, a use of valuable 
city resources with an expected return. That return is not always financial, but some social good 
expected to come from the investment, something greater than what was there prior. As Michael 
mentioned, when partnering with third party organizations, the city looks to those who have 
experience and history, those who are demonstrably rooted in their communities, have broad and 
deep coalitions. The city demands that CLTs create a capacity to responsibly hold property, 
successfully develop productive uses on that land, and most importantly accurately represent the 
community’s needs. In this sense, the city legitimizes through its own lens what constitutes 
community representation. 
While the city is fully capable of thoroughly supporting the CLT model, and seems to be 
planning on doing so, many in the movement are skeptical of what this would look like. As 
government assistance is arguably necessary in the growth and success of the CLT model in New 
York City, the types of assistance put into policy can vary greatly, and perhaps push the model 
away from its intended goals. As government support increases, the level of true community 
control of the land is likely to decrease, as intervention most often comes with regulatory 
agreements, requirements of use of government resources from funding to the land itself. We see 
this already happening in the case of NMCLT, where HPD is requiring them to incorporate as an 
HDFC, essentially limiting their use of acquired property to housing. While this may be justified 
in that the city must ensure that its own land use goals are upheld, and that regulatory agreements 
serve to ensure the theoretical return on investment, it does limit the community’s ability to 
control decisions of land use to their fullest capacity. 
Some organizers, like Mychal of MHPMCLS, see city intervention as not a priority for 
the movement. As mentioned previously, the historical relationship between the city and many of 
these communities is a troubled one of disinvestment and unfulfilled promises. Signing into deals 
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with the city over what is meant as an ownership structure absent of the city is understandably an 
unappealing proposition for many. CSCLT well understands the financial significance of a 
relationship with the city, and NMCLT has been working closely with HPD in their 
incorporation process. Yet some CLTs like MHPMCLS and WQCLT are less motivated to 
garner a relationship with the agency, well aware that the city often has its own agenda differing 
to some extent from their own. The city more or less sees the CLT model as another tool to 
address affordable housing. While this can be a common goal with a CLT, it is not ensured, and 
can hinder or complicate the work of organizations focused on other uses. In the case of 
WQCLT, their organizing was born out of a fight with ​this​ administration specifically over land 
use, leaving Scott and other members rightfully unwilling to negotiate any further. 
The acquisition of land, however, is one barrier that all of the CLT members interviewed 
for this research could agree is a pivotal point where government intervention is required. When 
considering which properties are most viable for transfer to CLT ownership, it is those which are 
either already under city control, or those which can easily fall into the hands of a city agency. In 
a report by the NYU Furman Center, the CLT model was found to be one of the most viable and 
strategic uses of city-owned land for combating gentrification (2016). During the financial and 
abandonment crises in the 1970s, the shared-equity model in New York City was born out of ​in 
rem​ seizures by the city with subsequent transfer to tenants and community organizations. Tax 
delinquency and foreclosure drove these properties into public ownership, through which third 
parties had the opportunity to acquire them. CLTs are likely not able to compete for property in 
the private market, where millions in debt and equity are necessary to buy the smallest lots on the 
fringes of the city. 
Programs like TPT allow for these kinds of transfers, where only the city can take 
properties through just and legal seizure out of the private sector and into community ownership 
structures. While CLT organizers can agree on this point, there is still wariness of city 
intervention, driven not only by the city’s historic favoring of the private sector and traditional 
development practices, but by knowledge of the regulatory agreements that come with such 
transfers of property. In these scenarios, the city can wield complete control over the types of 
uses applied to this land upon transfer. HPD, operating the TPT program and owning the vast 
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majority of city-owned property, has an agenda, just as every CLT has its own set of goals for 
these parcels. This type of uneven power dynamic may very well result in the restriction of land 
use by CLTs to housing for example. As we have discussed, many CLTs hope to develop 
community centers, gardens, and local commercial and manufacturing uses. 
The city must facilitate the transfer of its own unused properties, as well as those it will 
continue to seize through Local Law 45, to CLT organizations. This is where the city can have 
the greatest impact on the movement, without replacing the crucial component of community 
control. CLT members agree that acquiring the land is the greatest hurdle, after which there are 
already mechanisms in place to finance development of whatever type, including leaving the 
parcel untouched with the solitary goal of thwarting speculation. Within this recommended role 
of the city comes the question of legitimacy of land use. What is considered by the city to be 
appropriate uses of its land? It is this question that greatly threatens the community’s control 
over its own assets, and can disrupt the purposes of the CLT model. The city must not intervene, 
as much as is possible, in what the community deems necessary of its own property. With this 
transfer must come minimal requirements, too many of which will surely jeopardize the 
community’s agency. Ensuring and requiring that the organization actively and accurately 
represents and embodies its constituents is an important role of the city, and should be enough to 
establish a trusting relationship between the two. Further intervention would ultimately 
undermine the role of the CLT. 
 
Identifying Viable Property 
The first step in the transfer process would be identifying properties ideal for CLT 
acquisition. Properties can be taken from the private sector through direct seizure or the TPT 
program, while failing HDFCs can also be adopted into CLT ownership, the most 
straightforward parcel to target are those already owned by the city. According to publicly 
available data, the city owns roughly 3500 properties across the five boroughs designated as 
having “no use.” These parcels vary in shape and size, zoning, general quality, and development, 
yet they all theoretically sit empty. While the majority of these parcels are vacant lots, many 
contain buildings both residential and non-residential, requiring different levels of renovation, 
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and currently sitting unoccupied. These are not properties sitting in abandoned or low-density 
areas, but are enmeshed in the built environment, in some of the cities densest cores. If the city is 
to support CLTs, these are the properties it should be targeting first. 
As a part of this research, I have created an online tool facilitating the targeting of these 
city-owned unused properties by CLT organizations. Using the city’s City-Owned and Leased 
Property (COLP) data, the map visualizes each property fitting this description, set with filtering 
options to narrow down each search based on preferences of the user. Filters include lot size 
range, use type, agency, borough, and number of units. Attached to each property is selected 
data, including geographic information, physical characteristics, and zoning and use details. 
Available data specifically include street address, community district, council district, latitude 
and longitude, property name, agency, use type, zoning, land use code, residential FAR, 
landmark status, assessed value, lot area, building area, number of buildings, and number of 
units. The map is intended for use by CLTs and affiliated organization to help target specific 




The map tool was created using a combination of R packages on the RStudio desktop 
application. These packages include shiny, leaflet, readr, and dplyr. Shiny was used to set up a 
user interface and background server to visualize and filter data, leaflet was used to create the 
interactive map feature, while readr and dplyr were used to clean and manage table data collected 
from the NYC Open Data portal (see opendata.cityofnewyork.us) and the Department of City 
Planning (see ​https://www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/data-maps/open-data.page#pluto​). 
 
Property Transfer Proposals 
Finally, the city must take action to facilitate this transfer of land, devising new and 
amended strategies for property distribution that prioritize shared-equity models and remove or 
drastically lessen the amount of intervention and control usually attached to such transfers. 
Understandably, the city traditionally demands a certain amount of control when handing land to 
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private or third party groups, ensuring the progress of its own municipal agendas.Yet it is 
possible to establish certain requirement that provide security in such investments without 
reducing the amount of community control necessary in a successful CLT model. Under this 
framework, several approaches can be tested, all under the notion that the city and CLT groups 
do in fact share many common goals, and can achieve these shared interests through 
collaborative, experimental, and equitable efforts. 
As the framework currently stands, many city-owned properties go through a Request for 
Proposal (RFP) process, wherein private entities submit proposals for uses of said land under 
guidelines set by the city. A proposal is then selected to be realized, and that property is either 
transferred to the private entity often for just one dollar, or that development and use is permitted 
through a ground lease. In either scenario, the city most often selects those firms with the most 
experience coupled with access to capital, therefore requiring fewer government subsidies. These 
RFPs are also issued often with strict guidelines as to allowable uses of the property, restricted to 
affordable housing, for example, with little room for negotiation on the part of the respondent. In 
these ways, this model of land transfer excludes smaller, more experimental organizations like 
CLTs, while greatly reducing the amount of agency any respondent has in envisioning their own 
uses for the land in question.  
A recommended strategy, one supported by all CLT members interviewed for this 
project, would be for the city to target properties it deems, with the help of community partners 
and expressions of interest from existing CLTs, viable CLT parcels. With these parcels, 
specialized RFPs would be issued, giving a strong priority to CLTs with nonrestrictive 
recommendations of use designed in collaboration with local CLT interests. The important factor 
of legitimacy would not be founded in the use itself, but in the coalition building and organizing 
power of the CLT, its ability to accurately represent and embody its community. The city would 
then select ideally a CLT most suited to own and steward the property, and transfer the land only 
with requirements to fulfill the selected proposal. This approach keeps intact both the necessary 
measures by the city to ensure the proper stewardship of land by a legitimate organization, as 
well as the community control component of the CLT model. 
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Aside from city-owned properties, privately-owned tax-delinquent properties are also 
viable for CLT ownership under the right circumstances. These properties, which far outnumber 
city-owned unused properties, can all be potentially seized through Local Law 45. One strategy 
the city has implemented in dealing with these properties is, as mentioned previously, the TPT 
program. TPT, which transfers seized tax-delinquent properties directly into the hands of 
non-profit organizations, is a successful yet underutilized means of not only recovering these 
properties but empowering local non-profits and the communities they serve. If expanded and 
geared toward CLTs, TPT can serve as another efficient and tangible strategy in not only 
combatting abandonment and private mismanagement of property, but in growing the CLT 
movement citywide. As has been mentioned, the city is not structured to be a property owner, 
and would thus benefit from directly transferring property into more responsible, accountable, 
and community-driven ownership. Legitimacy measures can mimic those of the RFP approach, 
allowing the city to confidently reinvest in these neglected properties without new financing 
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